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SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND TAX BENEFITS
IN FEDERAL AND STATE JUDICIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
JOSEPH 0. OLUWOLE* AND PRESTON C. GREEN III*
School choice advocates contend that government aid programs, such as
vouchers, tax credits, and tax deductions, increase educational opportunities
for students from lower income households to attend private schools that
perfom better than their local public schools. Opponents contend, however,
that such aid programs threaten the viability of the public school system and
compel or encourage taxpayer funding of sectarian schools, fueling concerns
about unconstitutional government overreach. Such concerns have instigated
a variety of constitutional challenges against government aid programs. This
Article presents a comprehensive review of the constitutionality of government
aid programs under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause,
standing, and the Equal Protection Clause. It also examines religion-based
challenges to government aid programs under state constitutional provisions
such as the Blaine Amendment and the compelled support clause. Besides
challenges involving government aid and sectarian schools, government aid
programs are also susceptible to challenge when secular private schools receive
government funding. For these challenges, petitioners rely on state
constitutional provisions rather than the federal Constitution, which does not
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proscribe government aid programs benefitting secular schools. This Article
examines judicial precedents on the efficacy of challenges to government aid
programs under state constitutional provisions governing educational efficiency,
uniformity, state control, local control, new debt, anti-gift, no aid, and public
purpose. Finally, this Article discusses the implications of the federal and state
government aid jurisprudencefor tax benefit and voucher legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
According to a 2015 Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice
study, 41% of Americans, when given the choice, would select private
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school for their children's education while 36% would select their
local public school.' In the same study, respondents were asked to
grade their local schools: 83% of respondents gave their local private
school an A or B grade compared to 46% for their local public
schools.2  Study respondents cited smaller class sizes, more
individualized attention from teachers, and better education quality
as reasons for the perceived higher quality of private school
education.3 Given many Americans' dissatisfaction with their local
public schools, some municipalities have looked to vouchers and tax
credits or tax deductions-collectively, tax benefits-to help fund
their children's education at private schools (including sectarian
schools) or at public schools outside their local school district. The
United States Supreme Court has advised, however, that the
Establishment Clause guards against government "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement" in religion.' Thus, one has
1. Paul DiPerna, Friedman Found. for Educ. Choice, 2015 Schooling in
America Survey: Perspectives on School Choice, Common Core, and Standardized
Testing 23 (2015). The data provided in the 2015 Schooling in America Survey was
gathered from interviews with around 1,000 adults across the United States regarding
the direction and quality of K-12 education. Id. at 2.
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Tax credits differ from tax deductions. As the Supreme Court of Arizona
explained, tax deductions "are subtracted from gross income, reducing the net
amount on which a tax is assessed," while tax credits "are taken directly from the tax as
tentatively calculated." Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 612 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc)
(citing Elizabeth A. Baergen, Note, Tuition Tax Deductions and Credits in Light of Mueller
v. Allen, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 157, 172-73 (1984); JAMES J. FREEIAND ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 969 (7th ed. 1991)).
The calculation of personal income tax can be broken into several stages. First
comes a determination of adjusted gross income, achieved by combining all
sources of income and subtracting certain expenditures, such as contributions
to individual retirement and medical savings accounts.... Next, taxpayers
may take certain deductions and exemptions. The resulting subtotal is taxable
income.... This figure is then referenced to the tables for a determination of
preliminary tax liability. But the process does not end there. In fact, this point
occurs about midway through the tax calculation and is, at most, a
determination of tentative, not actual, tax liability. The tax preparer may
continue to reduce this amount by subtracting credits and other payments.
Only after exhausting all of these opportunities does the taxpayer arrive at
the bottom of the tax form and the inevitable-amount owed.
Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he
potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is
aggravated ... by the need for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood
of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow." Id. at 623.
13372016]
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to wonder if voucher and tax benefit programs-collectively,
government aid programs-used for sectarian schools violate the
Establishment Clause.' This wonder should further pique curiosity as
to whether these programs may violate other constitutional provisions.
This Article seeks to inform the public, policymakers, educators,
and public and private school officials about the constitutional
viability of government aid programs.' Part I provides a general
overview of the legal issues regarding school vouchers and tax
benefits. Part II reviews federal constitutional issues implicated in
government aid programs. With respect to federal issues, this Article
discusses case law regarding the Establishment Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause, standing, and the Equal Protection Clause.' Part III
examines state constitutional challenges to government aid
programs.' These state challenges include religion-based challenges,
6. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Separation of church
and state constituted a paramount principle and goal in the minds of some of the most
influential of the Framers both by dint of historical experience, and personal
conviction." (footnotes omitted)). Note that at various points in this Article, we might
simply refer to vouchers, tax deductions, and tax credits as government aid programs.
7. See Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 612 ("Petitioners contend that credits are
constitutionally different from deductions, which they concede to be perfectly
proper. At oral argument they asserted that a tax credit is the 'functional equivalent
of depleting the state treasury by a direct grant,' while a tax deduction merely serves
as 'seed money' to encourage philanthropy. We disagree.").
8. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause
provides that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]." Id. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause[] are frequently in tension." Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
718 (2004) (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)). The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has
articulated a great distinction between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause: "The Free Exercise Clause addresses the 'negative,' it prevents
the government from interfering with religious practice, while the Establishment
Clause addresses the 'affirmative,' it prevents the government from sponsoring or
establishing a religion." Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 135 (Me.
1999). It is important to note that the Establishment Clause can sometimes provide
the compelling reason to infringe on rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Strout,
178 F.3d at 61, 65.
9. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 ("Most States that sought to avoid an establishment
of religion around the time of the founding placed in their constitutions formal
prohibitions against using tax funds to support the ministry."); see also K Hollyn
Hollman, Gen. Counsel, BaptistJoint Comm. for Religious Liberty, School Choice: The
Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism, U.S. COMM'N ON CIv. RTs. 15 (2007),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/BlaineReport.pdf (noting that "[t]he principle that
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such as the Blaine Amendment challenges, as well as non-religion
challenges, such as efficiency, uniformity, state control, local control,
new debt, anti-gift, no-aid, and public purpose provision challenges.o
The final section discusses some principles that a government aid
program must satisfy to comply with federal and state constitutions.
I. OVERVIEW OF VOUCHERS AND TAx BENEFITS
Vouchers, tax credits, and tax deductions are designed to ease the
financial burden on parents who send their children to private
schools. Tax deductions are offered to individuals and businesses to
reduce the net amount upon which their tax liability is calculated
based on specified educational expenses such as tuition,
transportation, and textbooks." Tax credits can be either individual
tax credits for dependents' educational expenses or individual or
corporate tax credits for contributions to an organization offering
scholarships for students to attend private schools:
Scholarship tax credit programs, sometimes referred to as tuition
tax credits, allow individuals, corporations or both to allocate a
portion of their owed state taxes to private nonprofit organizations
that issue private school scholarships to K-12 students. The
scholarship allows a student to choose among a list of private
schools approved by the scholarship organization. The scholarship
is used to pay tuition, fees and other related expenses. As a result,
the state does not have to appropriate per-pupil education funding
for students that receive scholarships.' 2
citizens should not be taxed to support religion harkens back to the fights for
disestablishment in the states"). Some states, such as Alabama, Illinois, Maine, North
Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, interpret their state constitution religion
clauses in line with federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Frank Kemerer,
School Vouchers: Constitutional Questions Remain, EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STs.
GovERNANCE NOTES (2002).
10. For the language of several of these constitutional provisions, see generally
Preston C. Green III & Peter L. Moran, The State Constitutionality of Voucher Programs:
Religion Is Not the Sole Determinant, 2010 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 275 (2010).
11. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983); Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 612
(citing Baergen, supra note 4, at 172-73; FREELAND ET AL., supra note 4).
12. JosH CUNNINGHAM, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, FIscAL IMPACr OF
SCHOOLVOUCHERS AND SCHOLARSHIP TAx CREDITS 1 (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/rese
arch/education/fiscal-impact-of-school-vouchers-and-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx; see
also DIPERNA, supra note 1, at 55 ("A 'tax credit' allows an individual or business to
reduce the final amount of a tax owed to government. Some states give tax credits to
individuals and businesses if they contribute money to nonprofit organizations that
distribute private school scholarships. A 'tax-credit scholarship system' allows
parents the option of sending their child to the school of their choice, whether that
school is public or private, including both religious and non-religious schools.").
2016] 1339
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School vouchers, on the other hand, are state-funded scholarships
that provide students with the opportunity to attend a private or
public school other than their local public school.1 3
The key distinction between tax benefits and vouchers is that
vouchers constitute a direct state expenditure whereas tax benefits
generally represent state loss of potential revenue." Another
distinction is that, while voucher programs offer tuition support "at
or near the state per pupil allocation," the tuition support from tax
benefit programs is generally well below the state per pupil
allocation. Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and Vermont provide vouchers at the state per pupil
allocation for public schools while Arizona, Indiana, Ohio, and
Wisconsin provide vouchers at less than the state per pupil
allocation." Students and schools seeking to be voucher recipients
must meet minimum standards set forth in various state laws.1 7 These
requirements could include eligibility restrictions that limit vouchers
to students who meet certain income thresholds or to special
populations of students, such as military families, foster care students,
students with disabilities, or students from chronically low-
performing schools."
Under a tax credit program, individuals or businesses lower their tax liability by
either the entire amount or a percentage of tuition paid to send children to private
school. Id.
13. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 1; see also RICHARD D. KOMER & CLARK NEILY,
INST. FORJUST. & AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, SCHOOL CHOICE & ST. CONsTrrTUTIONs: A
GUIDE TO DESIGNING SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 2-3 (2007) (defining voucher
programs and tax credit programs).
14. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 1. Tax credits can also constitute
expenditures when a taxpayer's tax credit exceeds his tax liability, entitling the
taxpayer to a rebate. Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 119-20 (Ala. 2015).
15. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 2; see also Elaine S. Povich, Tax Dollars for
Private School Tuition Gain in States, PEW CHARITABLE TR. STATELINE (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/06/
tax-dollars-for-private-school-tuition-gain-in-states (stating that purchasing power for
students under the tax credit and voucher programs can vary from Iowa's maximum
of $250 for tax credits to Maine's 115% of per pupil allocation for vouchers).
16. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 2. The exception would be for students with
disabilities in a state like Utah where the student with disabilities might get more
than the state per pupil allocation depending on the tuition of the private school.
Nonetheless, under no circumstance can the student get more than the school
charges in tuition. Id.
17. See generally id. at 1-4 (setting parameters for student eligibility, typically
targeting low-income students, students attending chronically under-performing
schools, students with disabilities, or students in military families or foster care).
18. Id. at 1.
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Americans generally support school vouchers and tax credits as
mechanisms to ease the financial burden on parents who send their
children to private schools. In 2014, 63'p of Americans favored
vouchers with a slight, statistically insignificant decrease to 61% in
2015.19 The intensity of support for vouchers relative to opposition is
high, with 34% strongly favoring it in 2015 (35% in 2014), and 21%
strongly disfavoring (20% in 2014) .2' Table 1 below shows the most
important reasons that people who strongly or somewhat favor
vouchers give for their support:
Table 1: Most Important Reasons that People Favor Vouchers2 1
Access to schools with better academics 38%
More parental freedom and flexibility 28%
More individual attention 17%
Access to sectarian schools 6%
Access to safer schools 6%
Something else/Other 3%
Six out of ten Americans in 2015 favored tax credit programs-a
slight, statistically insignificant decrease from 64% favoring such
programs in 2014.2 Like vouchers, the intensity of support for tax
credits relative to opposition is high, with 28% strongly favoring it in
2015 (27% in 2014) and 16% strongly disfavoring (14% in 2014)."
Vouchers and tax credits are gaining popularity among state
legislatures as well, as states are increasingly enacting voucher and tax
credit programs. In 2015, 41% of respondents in the Friedman
Foundation for Educational Choice study recommended vouchers as
the appropriate state intervention for low-performing public
schools.24 Thus, it is not surprising that parental choice and student
19. DIPERNA, supra note 1, at 39.
20. Id. at 39, 45.
21. Table adapted from DIPERNA, supra note 1, at 43. Similar data is unavailable
for tax credits.
22. Id. at 53. Similar data is not available for tax deductions.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 62-64. By comparison, 26% recommended conversion of traditional
public schools to charter schools, 25% recommended personnel (school leadership
and other staff) dismissals, and 18% recommended school closure. Thus, vouchers
at 41% was the highest-recommended intervention. Id.
2016] 1341
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choice increasingly appear to be buzzwords in various state legislative
halls and political circles as many states enact laws providing for
school vouchers and tax benefits." As of 2014, thirteen states and the
District of Columbia had enacted voucher programs, while as of 2016,
sixteen had enacted tax benefit programs.26 Table 2 sets forth the
school choice programs in various states:
Table 2: State school choice programs2 7
Alabama Accountability
Act of 2013 School Choice Individual Tax Credit
Tax Credit/Rebate
Alabama
Alabama Accountability
Act of 2013 School Choice Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarships
Personal Tax Credits for
School Tuition Tax Credit Scholarship
Organizations
Corporate Tax Credits for
School Tuition Tax Credit Scholarship
Arizona Organizations
Lexie's Law Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship
Tax Credits
Empowerment Educational Savings
Scholarship Accounts Account
25. Scholarship Tax Credits: Overview, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIs., http://www.ncsl.
org/research/education/school-choice-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx (last visited Aug.
18, 2016); Povich, supra note 15; ALEXANDRA USHER & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC.
POL'Y, KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT SCHOOL VOUCHERs: A REVIEW OF MAJOR
DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH 13 (2011), http://cep-dc.org/cfcontentfile.cfm?Attac
hment=Kober%5FFullReport%5FVouchers%5FO60100%2Epdf%20.
26. Scholarship Tax Credits: Overview, supra note 25; School Vouchers, NAT'L CONr. OF
ST. LEGIs., http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-vouchers.aspx
(last visited Aug. 18, 2016); see also Povich, supra note 15 ("Thirteen states created or
expanded tuition tax credits, private school scholarships or traditional vouchers in
2013, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. Eight states did so
in 2012 and seven states in 2011, according to the group.").
27. Table adapted from Povich, supra note 15 (citing the FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR
EDUC. CHOICE). Note that town tuition programs target students from remote rural
areas. USHER & KOBER, supra note 25, at 13.
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Colorado ~ Choice Scholarship PilotVoceColoradoVoucher
Program
District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Voucher
Program
John M. McKay
Scholarships for Students Voucher
Florida with Disabilities Program
Florida Tax Credit
Tax Credit ScholarshipScholarship Program
Georgia Special Needs
Voucher
Scholarship Program
Georgia Private School Tax Credit
for Donations to Student Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarship Organizations
Education Expense Credit Individual Tax Credit
Iowa School Tuition
Tax Credit Scholarship
Organization Tax Credit
Tax Credits for
Illinois Individual Tax Credit
Educational Expenses
School Scholarship Tax Tax Credit Scholarship
Credit
Indiana Choice Scholarship Voucher
Program
Tuition Tax Deduction Individual Tax Deduction
Elementary and
Secondary School Tuition Individual Tax Deduction
Deduction
Student Scholarships for
Educational Excellence Voucher
Louisiana
Program
School Choice Pilot
Program for Certain Voucher
Students with
Exceptionalities
2016] 1343
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Tax Credit for Donations
to School Tuition Tax Credit Scholarship
Organizations
Maine Town Tuitioning Program Voucher
K-12 Education
Individual Tax
Minnesota Subtraction and K-12
Education Credit
Mississippi Dyslexia
Therapy Scholarship for Voucher
Students with Dyslexia
Mississippi Program
Nate Rogers Scholarship
for Students with Voucher
Disabilities Program
Tax Credits for Children
Individual Tax Credit
with Disabilities
North Carolina
Opportunity Scholarship Voucher
Program
School Choice
New Hampshire Scholhi Tax Credit ScholarshipScholarship Program
Autism Scholarship Voucher
Program
Cleveland Scholarship and Voucher
Tutoring Program
Ohio Educational Choice
VoucherScholarship Program
Jon Peterson Special
Needs Scholarship Voucher
Program
Lindsey Nicole Henry
Scholarships for Students Voucher
with Disabilities
Oklahoma
Oklahoma Equal
Opportunity Education Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarships
Educational Improvement
Pennsylvania Tal Ire nt Tax Credit ScholarshipTax Credit
1344 [Vol. 65:1335
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Educational Opportunity Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarship Tax Credit
Tax Credits for
Rhode Island Contributions to Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarship Organizations
Carson Smith Special
Utah Needs Scholarship Voucher
Program
VirginiaEducational Opportunity Tax Credit Scholarship
Scholarship Tax Credits
Vermont Town Tuitioning Program Voucher
Milwaukee Parental
VoucherChoice Program
Wisconsin
Parental Private School
Voucher
Choice Program (Racine) Voucher
These programs are designed to offer public support to parents
who want to send their children to schools other than their local
public schools." Expectedly, vouchers and tax benefits have
significantly more support from low-income earners than high-
income earners," but these benefits are being increasingly extended
to middle-income earners.so
Although some taxpayers have challenged the constitutionality of
these programs,3 1 advocates argue that the programs lead to taxpayer
savings because the cost of educating the choice students in their
local public schools exceeds the cost of supporting their tuition
under government aid programs.3 ' That is not necessarily the case
with every school, however. For instance, Alabama anticipated a huge
28. The electorate has voiced opposition to private choice programs through
defeated referenda in states such as Utah, California and Michigan. See USHER &
KOBER, supra note 25, at 20-21 (discussing defeated referenda).
29. DIPERNA, supra note 1, at 43, 53-54. This data is not available for tax
deductions.
30. USHER & KOBER, supra note 25, at 5. However, not everyone agrees with the
expansion to middle-income earners. Id. at 6.
31. See generally Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146
(2011) (indicating the United States Supreme Court's unwillingness to entertain
taxpayer-based challenges to tax credit programs by dismissing the case based on a
lack of Article III standing).
32. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 1.
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loss of about $40 million from its tax credits, so it had to account for
that loss in the state budget." The state director of the Legislative
Fiscal Office conceded that " [o]ur sense is that $40 million is going
to be enough but we don't know. It's a question of how many are
going to opt for private schools." 34 Additionally, a study of Arizona's
tax credit program concluded similarly, noting that
From the estimates, the net cost to the General Fund ranges from $42
million to $54 million, with the average net cost to the General Fund
being $49 million, showing unequivocally that regardless of whatever
educational merit the program has, the tax credits do not pay for
themselves, and contribute to the shortfall in the General Fund.
Despite the growing movement to adopt vouchers and tax benefits
in various states, these programs might not be leading to improved
academic achievement.37 For instance, the Center on Education
Policy reports that studies since 2000 reveal that there is generally "no
clear advantage" in student achievement for those who use vouchers
to attend private schools." Even voucher advocates, such as Rick
Hess of the American Enterprise Institute, appear to recognize this
fact: "First off, 20 years in, it's hard to argue that the nation's biggest
and most established voucher experiment has 'worked' if the
measure is whether vouchers lead to higher reading and math
scores."3 9  Similarly, Charles Murray of the American Enterprise
Institute opined that "[a] s an advocate of school choice, all I can say
is thank heavens for the Milwaukee results. Here's why: If my fellow
supporters of charter schools and vouchers can finally be pushed off
their obsession with test scores, maybe we can focus on the real
33. Povich, supra note 15.
34. Id.
35. DAVE WELLS, ARIZONA'S TuITION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM'S LIMITED IMPACT ON
PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 16 (2010), http://www.public.asu.edu/-wellsda/resear
ch/ArizonasTuitionTaxCreditProgramandPrivateSchoolEnrollment.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Povich, supra note 15 (showing the expansion of school voucher
adoption).
37. See, e.g., USHER & KOBER, supra note 25, at 9 ("While some studies have found
limited test score gains for voucher students in certain subject areas or grade levels, these
findings are inconsistent among studies, and the gains are either not statistically
significant, not clearly caused by vouchers, or not sustained in the long run."). See
generally id, at 22-46 (discussing various studies on the impact of voucher programs).
38. Id. at 3, 8-12; see also id. at 5 ("In study after study, students utilizing vouchers
appear to perform no better than their peers left behind in the public schools."
(quoting Michael J. Crossey, Vice President of the Pennsylvania State Education
Association)).
39. Id. at 4.
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reason that school choice is a good idea." 0 Consequently,
proponents now harp on parent and student choice as an intrinsic
and capable value, parent satisfaction, and improved student
graduation rates as rationales for enacting voucher programs.4 1
Table 3 sets forth the most important reasons that people who
strongly or somewhat oppose vouchers give for their opposition:
Table 3: Most important reasons for opposition to vouchers4 2
Divert funds from public schools 57%
Something else/Other 12%
Cause fraudulent behavior _9%
Benefit unaccountable private schools 7%
Cause student transportation problems 6%
Send funding to religious schools 4%
As a result of government aid programs, public school districts face
great pressure from the threatened loss of their student population,
affecting their student funding, which is based on state per pupil
allocation, and thus their continued viability. Some of the 57% of
40. Id. at 5. A University of Arkansas School Choice Demonstration Project
(SCDP) study of Milwaukee's voucher program found no significant differences
between the academic performance of third-grade through eighth-grade voucher
students and Milwaukee public school students. Id. at 9.
41. Id. at 3-4, 10; see id. at 48 ("[P]olicy decisions about vouchers are often
influenced by factors other than evidence from research about their impact or
effectiveness. Many policymakers and other influential players in voucher debates have
strong opinions about vouchers that are based on philosophy and values. Perhaps this is
why the evidence that vouchers have not had a strong impact on student achievement has
not slowed the push for new voucher programs in many states.").
42. Table adapted from DIPERNA, supra note 1, at 44. Similar data is not available
for tax credits; however, tax credits are opposed for similar reasons. Scholarship Tax
Credits: Overoiew, supra note 25; see also Povich, supra note 15 ("[T]he Alabama
Education Association, like the American Federation of Teachers and other teachers'
groups across the country, opposes the private school tuition tax credit program, on
both fiscal and ideological grounds. 'It's very disheartening, at a time when we are
seeing revenue actually go up,' said Amy Marlowe of the association. 'That's money
we do have available to spend on (public) education and it's going to be funneled to
private schools."').
43. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 4; see also Povich, supra note 15 ("The effect
on states' treasuries is up for debate. In a widely-cited 2008 study, Florida estimated
2016] 1347
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Americans interviewed who said they opposed vouchers due to fund
diversion might be able to bring state constitutional challenges
against voucher programs in their states, as discussed later in this
Article. Government aid programs could also be subject to federal
and state constitutional challenges,4 4 particularly when they allow
parents to use their vouchers and tax benefits for sectarian schools.4 5
We discuss these constitutional challenges next.
II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO VOUCHERS AND
TAx BENEFITS
This section reviews federal constitutional challenges that have
been brought against vouchers and tax benefits, as well as the hurdles
that these challengers have to clear. These challenges involve issues
of standing, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause. 6
A. Standing
Although some taxpayers might want to bring federal
constitutional challenges in federal court against jurisdictions with
government aid programs based on their status as taxpayers, the
it saved $1.49 in per-pupil costs for every $1 it lost in revenue due to the private
school tax credits, for a total of $39 million. But other estimates say states lose
money on the tax incentives.").
44. USHER & KOBER, supra note 25, at 20-21. Government aid programs have
existed, and faced opposition, for a long time. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 48-49 (1997) ("The
single most famous American statement on disestablishment, James Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, was written in opposition to
the general assessment bill in the Virginia legislature, which would have provided tax
support for teachers of the Christian religion. If history settles anything in this area,
it is that a general assessment would be unconstitutional.... The general assessment
was a tax solely for the support of clergy in the performance of their religious
functions. The reason for supporting religious functions was not that they fell within
the neutrally drawn boundaries of some larger category of activities to be supported
by the state. Rather, religion was to be singled out for special support because the
state deemed it to be of special value.").
45. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12; Scholarship Tax Credits: Overview,
supra note 25.
46. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973) ("It has never been held
that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for
education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the
maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a
matter of equal protection, receive state aid.").
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Supreme Court has rejected taxpayer standing except in
Establishment Clause cases."
The Court has examined the standing doctrine for taxpayers and
noted that, to have standing, a taxpayer must have a specific
grievance to challenge the allotment of federal funds. "Standing
determines whether the person is the proper party to request
adjudication of a certain issue and does not decide the issue itself.""
The Supreme Court first recognized the standing doctrine in
Frothingham v. Mellon," by holding that a federal taxpayer could not
rely on taxpayer status to challenge the use of government funds
under a federal law."o The Court reasoned that because a taxpayer
has only a minor interest in the government's use of funds, similar to
that of millions of other taxpayers, allowing suit based on taxpayer
standing would allow taxpayers to use the judiciary to dictate and
disrupt public policies and discretionary decisions of the other
branches of government." To have standing, a taxpayer must show
that he has suffered, or is facing immediate threat of suffering, a
direct injury rather than a generalized injury shared with other
taxpayers." Despite the Court's holding, taxpayers continued to
bring suits challenging government use of funds based solely on
taxpayer standing.
The Frothingham Court also ruled that municipal taxpayers have
taxpayer standing to bring suit challenging expenditures by
47. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-102 (1968). Without relying on taxpayer
standing, taxpayers can also bring suit if they show that they suffered personal injury
or face immediate threat of injury that is redressable through judicial relief. Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (plurality opinion);
see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 ("'The gist of the question of standing' is whether the
party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."' (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
48. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heath, 280 P.3d 328, 332 (Okla. 2012).
49. 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
50. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 91-92; Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 453, 487 (denying a
taxpayer standing in a challenge to the appropriation of federal funds to help states
reduce maternal and infant mortality); Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III,
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation and Taxpayer Standing, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1203, 1214 (2008).
51. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487-88. The Court explained that a taxpayer's self-
interest in treasury funds is nearly indeterminable, providing the taxpayer with no
basis to appeal to a court of equity. Id. at 487.
52. Id. at 488.
53. See, e.g., Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952)
(dismissing the case for lack of standing).
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municipal corporations because of the "peculiar relation of the
corporate taxpayer to the corporation, which is not without some
resemblance to that subsisting between stockholder and private
corporation."5 ' Because of this relationship, municipal taxpayers have
a "direct and immediate" interest in municipal spending that, unlike
generalized grievances, is justiciable."
Finally, in Flast v. Cohen," the Court ruled on whether federal
taxpayers could rely on taxpayer standing to bring Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause challenges to government use of
funds. The plaintiffs claimed taxpayer standing in filing suit against
the federal appropriation of funds under the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, supporting the education of
students from low-income families as well as the acquisition of
instructional materials in private schools. 57 The plaintiffs claimed
that, since the funding benefited sectarian schools, the appropriation
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.58 The Free
Exercise Clause claim argued that the federal expenditures in
question amounted to compelled taxation in violation of the
taxpayers' right to free exercise of religion.5 ' The compelled taxation
similarly formed the crux of the Establishment Clause claim.' The
Court ruled that the taxpayers had standing to bring their
Establishment Clause claim but did not rule on taxpayer standing for
the Free Exercise Clause claim."
Although federal taxpayers can establish standing in federal court,
they must first satisfy their burden of proof. The Court stated that
federal taxpayers seeking to establish standing in federal court must
satisfy two nexuses to prove that their claim is more than a
generalized taxpayer grievance: (1) there must be a logical
connection between the party's status as a taxpayer and the type of
54. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
55. Id. at 486; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006).
56. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
57. Id. at 85-86.
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Id. at 87.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 104 n.25. The Court stated, however, that "standing requirements will
vary in First Amendment religion cases depending upon whether the party raises an
Establishment Clause claim or a claim under the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 102; see
also id. at 105 ("We have noted that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art.
I, § 8. Whether the Constitution contains other specific limitations can be
determined only in the context of future cases.").
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legislative enactment being challenged; and (2) there must be a
logical connection between the party's status as a taxpayer and the
alleged constitutional infringement's precise nature.2
A taxpayer cannot satisfy the first nexus by simply claiming that the
government has engaged in incidental spending for administration of
what fundamentally constitutes a regulatory statute. A federal
taxpayer can only have standing under the first nexus when
challenging the constitutionality of legislative power under Article I,
Section 8-the Taxing and Spending Clause."
To establish the requisite precision under the second nexus, a
taxpayer must show that the expenditure exceeded a particular
constitutional restriction on Taxing and Spending Clause power;"
merely showing that the expenditure exceeded general limitations
under Article I, Section 8 is insufficient.' Two such constitutional
limits are the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.6
The Court ruled that the taxpayers in Flast satisfied both nexuses
because their constitutional claim was that the substantial
expenditure in question exceeded the Establishment Clause
restriction on legislative power to provide for the general welfare
under the Taxing and Spending Clause.' The Court singled out the
Establishment Clause because "[olur history vividly illustrates that
one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the
Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing
and spending power would be used to favor one religion over
another or to support religion in general.""
62. Id. at 102-03.
63. Id. at 102.
64. Id. The Taxing and Spending Clause provides, "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. . .. "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
65. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03; see id. at 106 ("The taxpayer's allegation in such
cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.").
66. Id. at 102-03.
67. Id. at 103, 104 n.25 ("This Court has recognized that the taxing power can be
used to infringe the free exercise of religion." (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 130 (1943)).
68. Id. at 103.
69. Id.; see also id. at 103-04 ("The concern of Madison and his supporters was
quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could
employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another or to aid
religion in general. The Establishment Clause ... operates as a specific constitutional
limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred
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The Court has limited its Flast ruling to only giving standing to
federal taxpayers unless the state-taxpaying petitioner satisfies the
Flast standing requirements in relation to the state legislature's taxing
and spending power." The Court in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cunon`
reasoned that the impact of state expenditures on individual
taxpayers is too remote to simply allow standing based only on
taxpayer status." Additionally, the Court explained that
[A]ffording state taxpayers standing to press such challenges
simply because their tax burden gives them an interest in the state
treasury would interpose the federal courts as 'virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness' of state fiscal
administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III
envisions for federal courts.
In order to satisfy Flast, state taxpayers must show that the State
exceeded the Establishment Clause limitation on its taxing and
spending powers.7 4
Furthermore, taxpayers cannot avail themselves of taxpayer
standing when challenging a state tax credit. In Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn," taxpayers claimed that Arizona's
tax credits for contributions to student tuition organizations
("STOs") that offer scholarships to private schools, including
religious schools, violated the Establishment Clause. Under the
program, individual taxpayers could receive up to $500 in dollar-for-
dollar tax credits-$1,000 for married couples-annually for their
STO contributions. The Court rejected the taxpayers' standing
by [Article I, Section 8]." (citations omitted)); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 139 (2011) ("Confirming that Flast turned on the unique features
of Establishment Clause violations, this Court has declined to lower the taxpayer
standing bar in suits alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the
Establishment Clause." (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345-46 (2006); see id. at 345
(likening state taxpayers to federal taxpayers in the context of standing analysis (citing
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989)); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (dismissing an appeal for lack of standing); see
also Winn, 563 U.S. at 149 (Kagan,J., dissenting) (explaining state taxpayer status).
71. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
72. Id. at 344-46.
73. Id. at 346.
74. Id. at 342-48.
75. 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
76. Id. at 129.
77. Id. at 130; see also id. (explaining that if a taxpayer qualifies for a tax credit
that is more than taxes owed, he can use the remaining credit each subsequent year
for up to five years).
1352 [Vol. 65:1335
SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND TAx BENEFITS
claim based on their taxpayer status." Accordingly, the Court
dismissed as speculative the taxpayers' argument that the STO tax
credits would lead to state budget deficits, thus increasing taxpayers'
tax liability, causing them direct injury." This dismissal was justified,
the Court explained, because the average value of a scholarship
might actually be less than the cost of educating students in a public
school, saving the state money."
Even so, it is presumptive to assume that the STO tax credits were,
in fact, the cause of any increase or decrease in taxpayer burden.
Additionally, the Court opined that the connection between
implementing an STO tax credit and a tax increase would be
tenuous.8 Furthermore, the Court found it speculative to think that
the government would pass along savings to taxpayers in the form of
lower taxes if the STO tax credit program was invalidated."
Consequently, an injunction in this case might not redress the
alleged injury." The Court concluded that "[e] ach of the inferential
steps to show causation and redressability depends on premises as to
which there remains considerable doubt. . . . The rule against
taxpayer standing, a rule designed both to avoid speculation and to
insist on particular injury, applies to respondents' lawsuit."" While
the Court dismissed the taxpayers' arguments as speculative, the
majority hypocritically engaged in conjecture about the potential
impact of STOs on state budgets, as evident in the Court's use of
words such as "might" or "could": "the STO program might relieve
the burden placed on Arizona's public schools. The result could be
an immediate and permanent cost savings for the State.""
78. Id.
79. Id. at 137 ("Even assuming the STO tax credit has an adverse effect on
Arizona's annual budget, problems would remain. To conclude there is a particular
injury in fact would require speculation that Arizona lawmakers react to revenue
shortfalls by increasing respondents' tax liability.").
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also id. at 137-38.
82. Id.; see also id. at 136 ("When a government expends resources or declines to
impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily suffer. On the contrary, the purpose of
many governmental expenditures and tax benefits is to spur economic activity, which
in turn increases government revenues." (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 344 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Id. at 136 (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989)).
84. Id. at 138.
85. Id. at 137 (emphasis added). The italicized words in the following quote
further highlight the Court's conjecture: "Underscoring the potential financial
benefits of the STO program, the average value of an STO scholarship may be far less
than the average cost of educating an Arizona public school student. Because it
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The Winn Court ruled that the Flast taxpayer standing standard
does not apply to tax credits due to the distinction between tax
credits and government expenditures: government expenditures
involve money already collected by the government in the form of
taxes, whereas tax credits involve money belonging to the taxpayer."
Since government expenditures are already in the government's
possession, they can form the basis of a standing claim. Tax credits,
on the other hand, represent the government declining to impose a
tax, giving the taxpayer more control over his money." Thus, with
the taxpayer retaining control, the Court ruled that tax credits do not
entail the compelled contribution necessary to make a Flast
Establishment Clause standing claim."
Even when some citizens avail themselves of tax credits, according
to the Court, other citizens remain free to use their money the way
they see fit." The Court opined that Arizona taxpayers had choices
as to what to do in the case of tax credits: they could take advantage
of the STO tax credit, opt for some other tax credit or deduction
through contribution to another charitable organization, or simply
use the money to pay their tax liability.' Taxpayers could also choose
not to contribute to STOs that fund sectarian scholarships."
Therefore, beyond the government's role in setting up the tax credit
opportunity, the government gives private citizens the keys to run the
STOs and gives taxpayers the private choice of whether to take
advantage of tax credits and which tax credits to claim." In essence,
the Court ruled that private choice was a circuit breaker between the
tax credit system and any subsequent sectarian uses of the STO
contributions that formed the basis of the tax credit. 3
encourages scholarships for attendance at private schools, the STO tax credit may not
cause the State to incur any financial loss." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 141-42.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 142-43 (suggesting that similar reasoning would apply to tax
deductions); see Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
789 (1973) (finding no constitutional significance in Establishment Clause
government aid jurisprudence between tax credits and tax deductions); see also
Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) ("[W]e see no
constitutional difference between a credit and a deduction ....
89. Winn, 563 U.S. at 142.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 143.
93. Id.; see id. at 144 ("Like contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions,
contributions yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass
directly from taxpayers to private organizations. Respondents' contrary position
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On the other hand, "[w] hen the government collects and spends
taxpayer money, governmental choices are responsible for the
transfer of wealth. In that case a resulting subsidy of religious activity
is, for purposes of Fast, traceable to the government's
expenditures."94 In other words, all taxpayers are obligated to
contribute to government expenditures. Consequently, any use of
such funding for sectarian purposes presents the threat of using "a
conscientious dissenter's funds in service of an establishment [of
religion]."" The same threat exists in the case of a sectarian STO
receiving money from the general tax revenues, as opposed to a
private contribution."
As critics note, however, the Court's distinction between tax credits
and government expenditures in order to preclude standing for tax
credit challenges effectively sanctions indirect government support of
sectarian education. Justice Kagan aptly captured the absurdity of
this distinction-without-a-difference:
[C]onsider an example far afield from Flast and, indeed, from
religion. Imagine that the Federal Government decides it should
pay hundreds of billions of dollars to insolvent banks in the midst
of a financial crisis. Suppose, too, that many millions of taxpayers
oppose this bailout on the ground (whether right or wrong is
immaterial) that it uses their hard-earned money to reward
irresponsible business behavior. In the face of this hostility, some
Members of Congress make the following proposal: Rather than
give the money to banks via appropriations, the Government will
allow banks to subtract the exact same amount from the tax bill
they would otherwise have to pay to the U.S. Treasury. Would this
proposal calm the furor? Or would most taxpayers respond by
saying that a subsidy is a subsidy (or a bailout is a bailout), whether
accomplished by the one means or by the other? Surely the latter;
indeed, we would think the less of our countrymen if they failed to
see through this cynical proposal.
Nevertheless, taxpayers might not be able to constitutionally
challenge indirect sectarian support due to the private-choice circuit
breaker. Moreover, districts losing funding or students to private
assumes that income should be treated as if it were government property even if it has
not come into the tax collector's hands. That premise finds no basis in standing
jurisprudence. Private bank accounts cannot be equated with the Arizona state
treasury.").
94. Id. at 143.
95. Id. at 142.
96. Id. at 144.
97. Id. at 156-57 (KaganJ., dissenting).
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schools might not be able to bring constitutional challenges due to a
lack of standing. This is because school districts are merely vehicles
of the State to accomplish the State's obligation to provide free
public education." Additionally, since school districts do not pay
taxes, they cannot rely on taxpayer status to bring such challenges.'
State taxpayers might also find it difficult to rely on taxpayer
standing to challenge vouchers and tax benefits in state court. In
Duncan v. New Hampshire," for instance, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire confronted this issue when taxpayers challenged a tax
credit program for businesses donating to organizations that provide
scholarships for students to attend private schools, including
sectarian schools.' Under the program, 85% of a business's
donation to the scholarship organization can be counted against its
profit-tax or enterprise-tax liability.1 02 The court refused to hear the
merits of a state constitutional challenge against the State's tax credit
program after finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the
case. 03 A state statute authorizing taxpayer standing existed, but the
court found it unconstitutional. 0  The court reasoned that
authorizing standing without requiring the taxpayer to show personal
injury that is redressable through judicial action would
unconstitutionally open the door to providing advisory opinions to
private citizens. 05 It would also engage the judiciary in policymaking
areas reserved for the other branches of government.'" Withal, the
court ruled that taxpayers cannot show personal injury by alleging
school district loss of students or district loss of funding due to the
98. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa Cty. v. Spry, 292 P.3d 19, 20 (Okla. 2012).
99. Id.
100. 102 A.3d 913 (N.H. 2014).
101. Id. at 918; see also id. (noting that the program also allowed students to attend
public schools outside their local school district).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 917.
104. Id.; see also id. at 919 ("The taxpayers ... have an equitable right and interest
in the preservation of an orderly and lawful government within such district;
therefore any taxpayer in the jurisdiction of the taxing district shall have standing to
petition for relief. . . ." (citing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 491:22 (2013))).
105. Id. at 921-22, 924-25, 928.
106. Id. at 923-24 ("[T]he requirement of a concrete, personal injury 'has...
separation-of-powers significance.' . . . When the concrete, personal injury
requirement is eliminated, courts 'assume a position of authority over the
governmental acts of another and co-equal department.'" (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992))).
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tax credit.' 7  Thus, showing redressable personal injury is vital in
most constitutional challenges by taxpayers unless the Flast
Establishment Clause exception is satisfied.
B. Establishment Clause Challenges
1. Background on the Supreme Court's government aid jurisprudence under
the Establishment Clause
Taxpayers have long challenged government use of public funds
for any form of support of sectarian education.108 Because such use
of public funds could be seen as promoting government support of
sectarian education, these cases are generally challenged under the
Establishment Clause.'09 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
however, the Establishment Clause is a particularly difficult area for
judicial interpretation."o The Court has even remarked that the
Establishment Clause is "at best opaque.""'
Lemon v. Kurtzman"' is the cardinal Supreme Court case in
government aid jurisprudence,"'3 responsible for the creation of the
Lemon test-the flagship test for determining if government aid to
sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause."" Under the
Lemon test, government aid complies with the Establishment Clause if
it satisfies three conditions: (1) the government aid has at least one
secular purpose;"' (2) the principal or primary effect of the aid is not
107. Id. at 926-27 (noting that the court declared any such loss purely
speculative).
108. See Comm. For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973) (identifying the two categories of cases in which the relationship between
religion and education usually arises as "those dealing with religious activities within
the public schools, and those involving public aid in varying forms to sectarian
educational institutions").
109. Id. at 786.
110. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1983).
111. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see also Kotterman v. Killian,
972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) ("The Establishment Clause, applicable to
the states by authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, proclaims that 'Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.' The simplicity of this language
belies its complex and continually evolving interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court." (citations omitted)).
112. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
113. See id. at 612 (indicating that government aid jurisprudence governs
vouchers, tax credits, and tax deductions because those are forms of government
aid).
114. Id. ("Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court. . . ." (emphasis added)).
115. Id.
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the inhibition or advancement of religion;"' and (3) the aid must not
foment "excessive government entanglement in religion.""
The Court developed the Lemon test at a time when states were
supporting white flight from public schools by providing funding to
private, and often sectarian, schools in an attempt to resist
desegregation."' Professor Douglas Laycock pointed out that the
Court was "at the height of its battle 'to achieve the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation' in public schools," and the prospect
of subsidized private schools posed a formidable obstacle to the
Court's efforts."' Aware of these concerns, the lawyers who brought
Lemon named an African-American man as the lead plaintiff and
"devoted ten pages of their brief to a segregation claim." 20 Although
none of the Justices ruled on the segregation claim, "it is hard to
believe that no Justice was influenced by it."1 21
In Lemon, the Court reviewed two government aid programs to
private schools: a Rhode Island teacher salary program and a
Pennsylvania textbook and teacher salary reimbursement program.1 2 2
The Rhode Island program paid teachers of secular courses in private
schools supplemental income worth 15% of their salary."' The state
116. Id. One commentator has described the importance of the distinction
between advancement and inhibition in the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence since Lemon:
Disaggregating the inquiry made it easy for advocates of the no-aid position
to implicitly use government inactivity as the baseline.... The disaggregated
inquiry did not require the Court to compare the 'advancing' effects of aid
to the 'inhibiting' effects of funding secular schools but not religious
schools, so the Court did not have to decide which was the greater departure
from neutrality. And anyway, the Court never took the 'inhibiting' prong of
Lemon seriously in the context of school finance. The Court summarily
rejected claims that refusing to fund religious schools discriminates against
those who wish to attend them, and it also rejected arguments that funding
should be permitted under the Establishment Clause because it serves free
exercise values.
Laycock, supra note 44, at 56 (footnote omitted).
117. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; see also Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1989) (explaining that excessive government entanglement requires more than
"routine regulatory interaction" with religious bodies but would prohibit "inquiries
into religious doctrine," "delegation of state power to a religious body," and "detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact between secular and religious bodies").
118. Laycock, supra note 44, at 61.
119. Id. (quoting Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)).
120. Id. at 62.
121. Id.
122. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
123. Id. at 607.
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implemented this program to stave off threats to private school
education from increased competition for quality teachers.1 24  It
provided, however, that private school teachers could not earn more
than the maximum salary of Rhode Island's public school teachers.12 5
To monitor private school compliance with various program
conditions, the State required financial records of eligible private
schools.2 2 All teachers who applied for the program taught at
sectarian schools, and approximately 95% of the state's private school
students attended sectarian schools.12 1 Pennsylvania designed the
program to support secular education within private schools and to
counteract the increased costs of education in those schools to keep
them viable.'12  The program reimbursed private schools for
textbooks and teacher salaries.'" Participating private schools could
be audited to ensure that reimbursement was only for secular
purposes.'" The majority of participating teachers taught in
sectarian schools; these schools accounted for over 96% of the state's
private school students.'
After finding that the secular purposes of each program stated
above were satisfactory, the Court centered its analysis on the third
prong of the Lemon test due to overwhelming evidence suggesting
excessive government entanglement.3 2 The excessive entanglement
prong requires inquiry into the nature of the government aid, the
sectarian school's character and purpose, and the consequent
relationship between the school and the government. 11 Based on
these factors, the Court held that both programs involved excessive
government entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause.1 34
The Court found the sectarian schools in the Rhode Island program
pervasively intertwined with religion. As evident by the nearly universal
presence of religious symbols in the schools, the religiously-oriented
extracurricular activities, and the predominance of nuns as teachers
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 607-08.
127. Id. at 608.
128. Id. at 609.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 609-10.
131. Id. at 610.
132. Id. at 613-14.
133. Id. at 615.
134. Id.
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created a prominently religious climate.13' The apparent religious
character and purpose of the sectarian schools, the Court concluded,
would lead to prohibited "entangle [d] church-state relationships."3 6
State monitoring of school compliance with the requirement that
government aid only support secular education further fueled this
entanglement due to the nature of the aid to the teachers.13 1
The government aid went directly to teachers, further intensifying
the entanglement issue. Unlike monitoring sectarian schools' use of
government aid for transportation, lunch, and even textbooks,
monitoring whether teachers are using government aid to teach
impermissible sectarian content is very challenging.33 The Court
expressed concern that a regime of "comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance" would follow, further entangling
government in religion.'3 9
The Court also found the sectarian schools in Pennsylvania were
pervasively religious, meaning that the close relationship between
the schools and the government created by the government aid
created a threat of excessive government entanglement in religion.'
In large part, this resulted from the State's efforts to ensure
compliance with the program's requirement that participating
teachers not teach sectarian courses.'4 2 The nature of the aid-direct
reimbursement of sectarian schools, as opposed to aid given directly
to students or parents-further heightened concerns of excessive
entanglement: "[A] direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant
135. Id. at 615-18 ("We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial
schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations
imposed by the statute and the First Amendment. We simply recognize that a
dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and
operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining
religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not inculcated or advanced by neutrals.").
136. Id. at 616.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 617 ("In terms of potential for involving some aspect of faith or
morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's
handling of a subject is not. We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under
religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the
purely secular aspects of precollege education.").
139. Id. at 619.
140. Id. at 620; see Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 950 n.7 (Me. 2006) ("A
school is pervasively sectarian when a 'substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in
the religious mission."' (quoting Huntv. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,743 (1973))).
141. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
142. Id. at 621.
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programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative
standards."' 3 The Court also held that the nature of the aid would
lead to political divisions as supporters of sectarian schools lobby for
more government aid while opponents lobby against such aid.' As
the Court cautioned, however, "political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."145
Government aid to sectarian schools was also challenged in
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,'4 6 in which
the plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge against a
New York law. The law provided private school grants and benefits to
low-income families.'4 7 Additionally, legislators facilitated these
grants to assist private schools facing urgent financial distress."' A
direct grant for facilities maintenance was made available to each
school at $30 per student annually."' The law also provided for a
tuition program, which reimbursed up to 50% of the private school
tuition bill of a parent earning less than $5,000 annually.' 50 Finally,
for those who did not qualify for the tuition reimbursement program,
the law offered parents making up to $25,000 in adjusted gross
income the opportunity to deduct a certain graduated amount from
143. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675); see also id. at 621-22
(noting that the government's post-audit power ensures an intimate and continuing
church/state relationship because the government can inspect and evaluate a church
school's financial records and then pass judgment on its findings); cf Laycock, supra
note 44, at 55 (characterizing the Court's classification of "pervasively sectarian"
institutions as "inconsistent and incoherent," making it difficult to determine
whether direct or indirect aid is permissible).
144. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
145. Id. at 622.
146. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
147. Id. at 762-63.
148. Id. at 768 n.22, 795; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002).
149. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 763. If the facilities were older than twenty-five years, the
grant was valued at $40. The law also tied the grant value to the average per-student
facilities and equipment maintenance costs in public schools by noting that the grant
may not exceed 50% of that average per-student cost. Id.
A number of consumer price index (CPI) inflation calculators estimate that $30 in
1972 equates to roughly $173 in 2016. See, e.g., CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISnCS (2016), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. This dollar value, and
the values that follow, are merely for comparison-they are necessarily speculative and
may not be equivalent to the amounts that legislatures today would use.
150. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 764. In 2016 dollars, this is roughly $29,000. CPTlnflation
Calculator, supra note 149.
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their adjusted gross income for every dependent that the parents
spent at least $50 on in private school tuition.51
Using the Lemon test, the Supreme Court accepted the promotion
of diversity and pluralism in public and private schools as secular
purposes for the New York grants law.15' The law, however, failed the
second prong of the Lemon test.15 ' The law did not restrict use of the
maintenance grants to secular purposes, allowing sectarian schools to
use the grants to fund sectarian ends.'" Consequently, the
unrestricted nature of the maintenance grant could have the primary
effect of advancing religion.155  Similarly, the unchecked tuition
reimbursement program also seemingly had the primary effect of
advancing religion because the program allowed parents unfettered
use of the tuition grant at sectarian schools, furthering sectarian
purposes.'- 6 Furthermore, as with the maintenance grants, the law
did not limit sectarian schools' use of the tuition grants to secular
purposes.'15  Therefore, the State could not rely on the fact that
parents, rather than the schools, received the tuition grants.'15  By
giving parents the grants, the State sought to accomplish indirectly
what it could not constitutionally do directly through direct tuition
payments to sectarian schools.'
The Court also viewed the tuition reimbursements as incentivizing
parents to send their children to private schools, including sectarian
schools; the primary effect of this was advancement of religion.'"
[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their
children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments
to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not the
actual dollars given eventually find their way into the sectarian
151. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765-66. The Supreme Court observed that it is difficult
to determine whether to characterize this income tax benefit as a tax deduction or a
tax credit; nonetheless, that distinction has no constitutional relevance to the
decision in the case. Id. at 789.
The dollar amounts here-$25,000 and $50 in 1972-equal about $144,000 and
$290, respectively, in 2016 dollars. CPIInflation Calculator, supra note 149.
152. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773.
153. Id. at 779-80, 791.
154. Id. at 774-80.
155. Id. at 780, 783.
156. Id. at 780.
157. Id. at 783.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 780, 783, 787-88.
160. See id. at 788 ("In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to
choose between public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which
can only be regarded as one 'advancing' religion.").
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institutions. Whether the grant is labeled a reimbursement, a
reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the same.' 6 1
The tax benefit program failed to satisfy the primary-effects prong
of the Lemon test for the same reason as the tuition reimbursement
program 62: legislators designed it to incentivize parents to send their
children to private schools that included sectarian schools.1 3
According to the Court, the only difference between the tuition
reimbursement program and the tax benefit program was one of
form. The reimbursement program involved a direct cash payment
to the parents whereas the tax benefit program reduced a parent's
tax liability." Besides, the tax benefit program failed to account for
parents' actual expenditures on tuition, thus creating potential net
windfalls for parents that incentivized them to choose sectarian
schools.66 The Court rebuffed the argument that the parents served
as a circuit breaker between the government and the sectarian use of
the tax credits, reasoning that no provision in the program assured
that the benefits served only secular-rather than sectarian-ends.'"
The Court, however, left open for future cases whether aid made
generally available to private recipients without respect to the
sectarian or non-sectarian nature of the schools benefiting from the
aid would violate the Establishment Clause. 6 7
The Court dismissed comparisons of the tax benefit program to the
tax-exempt status afforded to churches. The Court reasoned that,
while tax exemptions have a historical tradition in the United States
dating back to the pre-revolutionary colonial era, the challenged
educational tax benefits in the case sub judice were a relatively new
innovation lacking a historical foundation." Moreover, given that
taxation could be a vehicle of hostility and oppression against
161. Id. at 786 (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 794, 804; see id. at 791 ("The qualifying parent under either program
receives the same form of encouragement and reward for sending his children to
nonpublic schools.").
163. Id. at 790-91.
164. Id. at 791.
165. Id. at 766; id. at 790 ("The amount of the deduction is unrelated to the
amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition, but is calculated on
the basis of a formula contained in the statute. The formula is apparently the
product of a legislative attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully
estimated net benefit" (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
166. See id. at 791 (applying the same rationale it relied on in rejecting the parent-
as-a-circuit-breaker argument to the tuition reimbursement program); cf id. at 783.
167. Id. at 782 n.38. This statement essentially hinted at the introduction of the
neutrality principle discussed infra note 192.
168. Id. at 792.
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sectarian institutions, tax exemption assures government neutrality,
minimizing such dangers.' The tax benefits, however, cannot
ensure neutrality:
Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with the principle
of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court. To the
contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who
send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable
effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions.1 7 0
Finally, the tax exemption is provided to all charitable
organizations, including churches; no evidence was offered that
churches are the exclusive or predominant beneficiaries of the
exemption.'7 1 Per contra, tax benefits predominantly benefit sectarian
schools.17 This very fact, the Court opined, portended "grave
potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political
strife over aid to religion,""' as competing constituencies lobby, and
even jockey for, increased aid-fueling deep political divides. 7 1
Additionally, on the same day the Court decided Nyquist, in Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty,1 7 1 the Court ruled on
the constitutionality of a New York law that appropriated $28 million to
reimburse private schools for recordkeeping costs and expenses for
state-created as well as teacher-created tests.17 6 Every year, each school
received $27 per first- through sixth-grade student based on average
daily attendance, and $45 per student for the other grade levels. 7 7
169. Id.; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) ("In Walz it was
argued that a tax exemption for places of religious worship would prove to be the
first step in an inevitable progression leading to the establishment of state churches
and state religion. That claim could not stand up against more than 200 years of
virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial experience and continuing into
the present"); cf Nyquist 413 U.S. at 793 (emphasizing that such financial aid was
designed to limit the government's involvement in religious matters).
170. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793.
171. Id. at 793-94.
172. Id. at 793.
173. Id. at 794.
174. Id. at 796-98. Various state courts have used the Nyquist rationales to
invalidate state programs that benefitted sectarian schools for violating the
Establishment Clause. For instance, in State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 219 N.W.2d 726
(Neb. 1974), the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that a tuition grant program to
support students' private school education violated the Establishment Clause because
schools where students could use the tuition grants were predominantly sectarian,
and the law did not restrict the use of the grants to secular ends. Id. at 728, 735.
175. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
176. Id. at 474-75.
177. Id. at 476.
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While the reimbursement program seemingly had a secular
purpose, it failed the Lemon test's second prong."' Specifically, as in
Nyquist, the program included no mechanism or attempt to assure that
the funds would only be used for secular purposes at the sectarian
school." Indeed, the Court found that secular and sectarian uses of
the aid would be indistinguishable and inseparable from each other.
Because teacher-created tests are so integral to teaching, it would be
difficult to monitor if teachers integrate sectarian content; and efforts
to distinguish sectarian and secular uses would foster excessive
entanglement under the Lemon test's third prong.8so
When addressing concerns of disabled individuals receiving
government aid used at sectarian schools, the Court generally finds
for the government. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind,' the Court upheld government funding for the sectarian
education of a blind student studying to become a pastor.'82
Washington's vocational rehabilitation program authorized funding
to provide vocational services, including education, for blind
students.' The state denied funding to the pastoral student, who
otherwise qualified for funding under the program, because he
planned to use the funds to continue his education at his bible
school.'" The Court upheld the program against the Establishment
Clause challenge because it satisfied the first two prongs of the Lemon
test.' The Court found a secular purpose in both the program's
design to support vocational services and the fact that only miniscule
aid would go toward sectarian education."
Under the second Lemon prong, the Court focused on whether
providing aid for the blind student's sectarian education would
178. Id. at 480.
179. See id.; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794.
180. Levitt, 413 U.S. at 480-81. Moreover, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
tests are state-mandated does not mean the State has to fund them in contravention
of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 481.
181. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 483.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 485-89.
186. Id. at 485-86; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 824 (2000) (plurality
opinion) ("[W]e have 'not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on
religious ends.'" (quoting Comm. for Pub. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 658 (1980))). This was a shift from prior cases discussed herein in which the
Court considered the proportion of aid to sectarian schools under the second or
third prong of the Lemon test.
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constitute prohibited direct government aid of a sectarian purpose or
permissible aid of a sectarian purpose mediated by private choice."s'
The Court likened permissible sectarian aid to a government
employee's use of his government-funded salary to support sectarian
ends, even when the government is fully aware of the employee's
intentions." The Court reasoned that, as with a government
employee's salary, "the Establishment Clause is not violated every
time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a
religious institution,"' especially when private choices are the
conduit for the fund transfer to sectarian ends.'"
To pass muster under the Lemon test's second prong, the
government must satisfy both the private-choice principle and the
neutrality principle. The private-choice principle authorizes
government aid to sectarian schools only when a private citizen
receiving aid independently chooses to use his aid at a sectarian
school."' The neutrality principle approves aid generally available to
beneficiaries, irrespective of the sectarian or non-sectarian nature of
the educational institution, provided that the program has no
underlying incentive to enroll in sectarian schools.' This financial
incentive element actually ensures that individual decisions under the
private-choice principle are genuinely independent: "For to say that
a program does not create an incentive to choose religious schools is
to say that the private choice is truly 'independent.""" In providing
the Court an avenue to uphold government aid to sectarian schools,
these two principles effectively represent a departure from the
Court's strong declaration in Lemon that "[u]nder our system the
187. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
188. Id. at 487-88; see also Mitchel 530 U.S. at 819 n.8 (plurality opinion)
("Similarly, we doubt it would be unconstitutional if, to modify Witters' hypothetical,
a government employer directly sent a portion of an employee's paycheck to a
religious institution designated by that employee pursuant to a neutral charitable
program." (citation omitted)).
189. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486.
190. Id. at 488.
191. Id.; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) ("We have viewed as
significant whether the 'private choices of individual parents,' as opposed to the
'unmediated' will of government, determine what schools ultimately benefit from the
governmental aid, and how much." (citations omitted)).
192. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. Another definition of the neutrality principle can be
found in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion) ("If a program offers
permissible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious,
and the irreligious, it is a mystery which view of religion the government has
established, and thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would be.").
193. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
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choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded
from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from
the affairs of government."'
Under the vocational rehabilitation program in Witters, the blind
student's bible school would only receive government aid because of
the student's private choice to use the aid at that school. 9 5 Pursuant
to the private-choice principle, the program design did not include
any incentives to encourage sectarian use of the fund.1 6 Additionally,
the program satisfied the neutrality principle because the
government aid was generally available to blind students without
respect to whether they used the funds at a sectarian or non-sectarian
school.' The Court also concluded that the program satisfied the
neutrality principle because the sectarian options under the program
were a fraction of the overall options for government funding use
available to blind students under the program.'9 8 In essence, the
Court considered the proportion of aid going to sectarian use as an
index under the first two prongs of the Lemon test.'"
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Districto was another case where
the Court had to decide the constitutionality of government aid that
ultimately benefitted sectarian schools.2 0 ' In that case, the school
district provided the student with a sign-language interpreter,
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), while he was
a student at its middle school. When he transferred to a sectarian
high school, however, the district refused to provide an interpreter
for classes at his sectarian school, citing a potential Establishment
Clause violation."' The student filed suit against the district,
claiming that providing the interpreter would not violate the
Establishment Clause.20 s The Supreme Court, applying the neutrality
principle, ruled that if aid is generally available to a broad class of
recipients defined without regard to religion, then the government
aid did not undercut the Establishment Clause, even if the sectarian
schools benefited from the government program.2 04 Such was the
194. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
195. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 486, 488.
200. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
201. Id. at 13,14.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id. at 8.
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case with the IDEA's provision for interpreters, which made
interpreters available to students without reference to whether the
aid was used at a public, private, sectarian, or secular school.0
Further, since the IDEA's interpreter provision included no
financial incentive designed to sway students toward sectarian
schools, the interpreter's presence at a sectarian school would only be
a result of the student's private choice.20 Accordingly, the
interpreter's aid at the sectarian school could not be attributed to the
government due to the mediating private choice of the student.207
The Court declared that, because the interpreter would not affect the
school's obligation to educate students, "the only indirect. economic
benefit a sectarian school might receive by dint of the IDEA is the
disabled child's tuition."' Consequently, the Court ruled that deaf
students were the primary beneficiaries, while sectarian schools were
merely the incidental beneficiaries."*
With this background as the framework for the Supreme Court's
government aid Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we next examine
how tax deductions and vouchers have fared under the jurisprudence.
2. The fate of tax deductions and vouchers in the United States Supreme
Court
The Court first examined the constitutionality of educational tax
deductions under the Establishment Clause in Mueller v. Allen.2"o This
case involved a Minnesota tax deduction program that authorized
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id.; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 814 (plurality opinion) ("We
hasten to add, what should be obvious from the rule itself, that simply because an aid
program offers private schools, and thus religious schools, a benefit that they did not
previously receive does not mean that the program, by reducing the cost of securing
a religious education, creates . . . an 'incentive' for parents to choose such an
education for their children. For any aid will have some such effect.").
207. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 817 (plurality opinion)
(underscoring the similarity in having the government provide funds to parents to
hire an interpreter and the government directly hiring one, as described in Zobrest).
208. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 12. The Court observed that the sectarian school
would only receive such economic benefit if three conditions were proved: (1) the
student would not have attended the sectarian school without the interpreter, (2) the
school would have been unable to enroll a replacement for that student, and (3) the
school made a profit per student. Id. at 10. The essence of this analysis is that
government aid can only have an impact where it functions as a direct subsidy or
windfall to a sectarian school. Id. at 12 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
209. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
210. 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
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taxpayers to deduct tuition, transportation, and textbook expenses
from their gross income."' Taxpayers could deduct a maximum of
$500 for each kindergarten through sixth-grade dependent and $700
for each dependent in other grades.21' The law specifically excluded
expenses for textbooks used for sectarian purposes.21' Approximately
95% of the state's private school students attended sectarian
schools." Consequently, some taxpayers challenged the tax
deduction program, claiming that it violated the Establishment
Clause by providing aid to sectarian schools.
The Court acknowledged the recondite nature of the
Establishment Clause and its interpretative challenges, especially the
government aid jurisprudence, despite the seemingly simple words of
the Establishment Clause.1 Nevertheless, the Court saw a clear path
to its decision in the case through applying the Lemon test.2 17 As with
other cases discussed herein, the Court was quick to find a secular
purpose for the tax deduction program-assisting parents with
educational expenses.2
The Court found that the tax deduction program satisfied the
second prong of the Lemon test based on the neutrality principle as
well as the private-choice principle. 9 The program satisfied the
neutrality principle for two reasons. First, it was one of several tax
benefits, which included medical and charitable tax deductions, in
the tax deduction statute.2 Second, the tax deduction was available
to a broad class of recipients that included secular private school
parents, sectarian private school parents, and public school
211. Id. at 390-91.
212. Id. at 390 n.1.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 391.
215. Id. at 392.
216. Id. at 392-93.
217. Id. at 394.
218. See id. at 394-95 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971))
("Little time need be spent on the question of whether the Minnesota tax deduction
has a secular purpose. Under our prior decisions, governmental assistance programs
have consistently survived this inquiry even when they have run afoul of other aspects
of the Lemon framework."). The Court indicated that the State had a number of
potential secular reasons for the tax deduction program including maintenance of a
viable and quality private education system, reduction of the level of tax burden that
would otherwise be placed on taxpayers if those students stayed in public school, the
need to support private schools to serve as benchmarks and competition to private
schools, and the need to share the tax burden more equitably. See id. at 395-96.
219. Id. at 396, 399-401.
220. Id. at 396.
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parents."' These reasons precluded state imprimatur for tax
deductions for educational expenses at sectarian schools."' This is in
contrast to tax deduction programs that single out sectarian schools
or sectarian school parents as beneficiaries."
The program also satisfied the private-choice principle because
parents were the conduit of the tax deduction's benefits to sectarian
schools through genuine independent private choices that were not
driven by a financial incentive designed to induce parents to select
sectarian schools. In essence, by providing the tax deduction to
parents, rather than as direct aid to a sectarian school, the program
was able to break away from state imprimatur of sectarian use-making
any sectarian benefits attenuated.2 Further, the Court contended
that, when balanced against the educational benefits offered by
sectarian schools, any attenuated benefits to such schools would be
acceptable given the Court's continuing jurisdiction over
Establishment Clause concerns.2 The Court rejected the argument
that the proportion of parents using the tax deduction at sectarian
schools should have constitutional significance because any embrace of
such an argument would create instability in government aid
221. Id. at 397.
222. See id. (articulating that "the provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect" (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 274 (1981))).
223. Id. at 397 n.7, 398.
224. Id. at 399 (recognizing that "the means by which state assistance flows to
private schools is of some importance" because "'the fact that aid is disbursed to
parents rather than to ... schools' is a material consideration in Establishment
Clause analysis, albeit 'only one among many to be considered'" (quoting Comm. for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973))); see also
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 814 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("When such an
incentive does exist, there is a greater risk that one could attribute to the
government any indoctrination by the religious schools.").
225. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400 ("The historic purposes of the Clause simply do
not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the
private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from
the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case."); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
810 ("For if numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a
government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria,
then a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special favors that might
lead to a religious establishment. Private choice also helps guarantee neutrality by
mitigating the preference for pre-existing recipients that is arguably inherent in any
governmental aid program . . .").
226. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
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jurisprudence, providing little guidance to governments offering such
aid and promoting inconsistencies in subsequent court rulings.2
Nineteen years after the Court's ruling on tax deductions, the Court
for the first time considered whether voucher programs violate the
Establishment Clause. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,228 the plaintiffs
challenged an Ohio law that authorized implementation of a voucher
program in Cleveland as a response to the academic crisis in the
Cleveland City School District.22' The voucher program included
tuition aid for kindergarten through eighth-grade students in
Cleveland to attend a private school or a public school other than the
Cleveland City School District.2" Students from families 200% below
the poverty line were eligible to receive 90% of the private school
tuition, but not more than $2,250, while other students could receive
75% with a cap of $1,875.3 Parents were issued a check and given the
freedom to use this tuition aid at sectarian or non-sectarian schools. 2
Sectarian schools made up 82% of the private schools participating in
the program and 96% of the participating students used their tuition
at sectarian schools during the 1999-2000 school year.233
The Court's analysis focused on the second prong of the Lemon test
because the program had a clear secular purpose of providing
227. See id. at 401 ("We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law. Such an
approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor
can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be
evaluated. Moreover, the fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim
the tax relief to which they are entitled-under a facially neutral statute-should be of
little importance in determining the constitutionality of the statute permitting such
relief."). Additionally, the Court found that the tax deduction program did not
create excessive entanglement even though state officials might have had to
continuously examine textbooks used in sectarian schools to ensure that deductions
were not taken for sectarian textbooks. According to the Court, such monitoring
would not differ from those presented in prior cases where the Court already upheld
state loans of textbooks to sectarian school parents. See id. at 403 (citing Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62
(1975), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968)).
228. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
229. Id. at 643-44, 647; see also id. at 644 (showing that Cleveland public schools
continuously appear on the list of worst performing public schools in the country).
230. Id. at 645.
231. Id. at 646.
232. Id. (explaining that the program also included tutorial aid for those students
who opted to stay in the Cleveland City School District).
233. Id. at 647.
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educational support to low-income families.231  Under the second
prong, the Court applied the private-choice principle as well as the
neutrality principle to the voucher program.3 The Court determined
that, under the program, sectarian schools received tuition aid only
because parents exercised true independent private choice with no
financial incentive in the program nudging parents toward sectarian
schools. 3 Indeed, if students used their vouchers at a public school,
that school got two to three times the tuition aid of a private school,
creating a disincentive for parents to use the voucher at any private
school.2 3 7 Moreover, while parents who used the voucher at private
schools had to copay at least part of the private school tuition, those
using the voucher at public schools did not, posing a further
disincentive to choose sectarian schools. 3 The program also gave
parents the opportunity to make a truly independent choice about
where to use the money among a variety of schools, including
participating public schools, secular private schools, sectarian schools,
or simply staying in the Cleveland City School District.239
Besides satisfying the private-choice principle, the voucher
program satisfied the neutrality principle because it was made
available to a broad class of recipients defined without respect to
religion.24 o Accordingly, the Court concluded that the presence of
the government aid at the sectarian schools could not be attributed
to the government, but rather to private individuals; thus, the aid
could not be regarded as direct subsidies, which are constitutionally
prohibited. Whereas earlier cases, such as Witters, found the
234. Id. at 649.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 653-54, 662; see also id. at 653-54 ("Such incentives '[are] not
present ... where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.' The program here in fact creates
financial disincentives for religious schools, with private schools receiving only half
the government assistance given to community schools and one-third the assistance
given to magnet schools." (citations omitted)).
237. Id. at 654.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 655 (noting that parents could also opt to send their children to
magnet or charter schools).
240. Id. at 662-63.
241. Id. at 649, 653-55; see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality
opinion) ("If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is neutrally available and, before
reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through the hands (literally
or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere,
the government has not provided any 'support of religion.'" (citing Witters v. Wash.
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proportion of aid used at sectarian schools consequential to
Establishment Clause analysis, Zelman found the proportion of aid
inconsequential.24 2 The Court echoed its decision in Mueller,
explaining that decisions on the constitutionality of government aid
would be unpredictable if the legal fate of vouchers were tied to either
the fluctuating numbers of people using vouchers at sectarian schools,
or the number of sectarian schools benefitting from vouchers.
According to the Court, such a link would lead to absurd results:
Indeed, by all accounts the program has captured a remarkable
cross-section of private schools, religious and nonreligious. It is
true that 82% of Cleveland's participating private schools are
religious schools, but it is also true that 81% of private schools in
Ohio are religious schools. To attribute constitutional significance
to this figure, moreover, would lead to the absurd result that a
neutral school-choice program might be permissible in some parts
of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of private
schools are religious schools, but not in inner-city Cleveland, where
Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed, but where
the preponderance of religious schools happens to be greater.2 4
Furthermore, the Court rightly stated that if one accounted for
student enrollment in all the schooling options, such as magnet
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986))); see also Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997) (" [W]e have departed from the rule ... that all government
aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid."); cf
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 815-16 (stating that, in 2000, government aid jurisprudence
focused primarily on private choice and neutrality rather than on whether aid was a
direct or an indirect subsidy).
242. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650, 658; see alsoJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 615
n.12 (Wis. 1998) (highlighting that the Court's previous decisions held that the
proportion of aid used at sectarian schools is inconsequential to Establishment
Clause analysis).
243. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650-51, 656-59, 659 n.5. The Supreme Court of Ohio
upheld the Cleveland program against a federal Establishment Clause challenge for
the same reasons as the United States Supreme Court. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711
N.E.2d 203, 207-11 (Ohio 1999). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio
interpreted the state's compelled support clause in accord with the federal
Establishment Clause and adopted the Lemon test for its analysis. Id. at 211-12. This
compelled support clause provision states that "[n]o person shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship,
against his consent." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. Based on the Leonn test, the court
ruled that the voucher program did not violate the compelled support clause. Goff
711 N.E.2d at 211-12 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
244. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 657-58 (citations omitted) ("Likewise, an identical private
choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as Maine or Utah, where less
than 45% of private schools are religious schools, but not in other States, such as
Nebraska or Kansas, where over 90% of private schools are religious schools.").
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schools, charter schools, and tutorial aid, for Cleveland City School
District students, the proportion of students in sectarian schools
would fall from 96% to 20%.
The Zelman decision was hailed as a historic decision for school-
choice advocates. As Professor Frank Kemerer observed, "[v] oucher
proponents consider Zelman v. Simmons-Harris to be in the same
league as Brown v. Board of Education.2 16 1 By enabling parents to use
public money to choose the schools their children attend, advocates
say, the Court has liberated low-income parents much as it liberated
black children in 1954. 12"a Although the Zelman decision is not a
Brown-scale bellwether of civil rights, it has parallels to Brown in that
the Court reversed prior courts as it did in Brown, which reversed
Plessy v. Ferguson."' In Zelman, the Court effectively abandoned its
ruling in Nyquist that government programs that offer benefits for
sectarian purposes cannot be justified by the parents-as-circuit-
breakers rationale"' and its ruling that such programs "cannot be
squared with the principle of neutrality." 2 o Yet, in Zelman, the Court
claimed that Nyquist was distinguishable because, in contrast to the
program in Zelman, the Nyquist program provided aid only to private
schools and private school parents. Further, the program was
designed to help struggling sectarian schools. In essence, the
Court found that, unlike the Zelman program, the Nyquist program
failed to make funds generally available in its quest to assist struggling
sectarian schools. Instead, the Nyquist program accorded regard to
the public/nonpublic and sectarian/non-sectarian nature of the
245. Id. at 659; cf id. at 647 (discussing the 96% enrollment). The Court
castigated the plaintiffs for not accounting for the fact that the increase in students'
sectarian use of vouchers from 78% in the 1997-98 school year to 96% in the 1999-
2000 school year was due to two secular private schools that had comprised 15% of
voucher students opting to become charter schools; thus, pulling out of the voucher
program. Id. at 659-60.
246. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
247. Kemerer, supra note 9.
248. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(defining the key aspect of the majority's opinion as "separate but equal"). But see
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (denouncing the concept of
"separate but equal").
249. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661-62; Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-83, 787-88 (1973).
250. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792-93.
251. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661.
252. Id. at 661-62.
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school benefitting from the program in violation of the newly-minted
approach to religious neutrality-the neutrality principle.5
The Lemon test, including the neutrality principle and the private-
choice principle, has become a staple of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and a guide to decisions in federal and state courts on
the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs sometimes look to state courts
for their Establishment Clause claims, particularly when they also
have state constitutional claims. The general feeling that the
Supreme Court provides plaintiffs with less recourse for
Establishment Clause claims has contributed to the flocking of
challengers to the state courts, especially with the neutrality and
private-choice principles effectively endorsing well-designed
government aid programs. In spite of what seems like a grim future
for Establishment Clause plaintiffs challenging government aid
programs, plaintiffs still bring Establishment Clause claims in state
court in hopes that a state court would invalidate the program. This
might be a wise decision because the Supreme Court only accepts a
minute percentage of cases for review. In the next section, this
Article examines state court Establishment Clause decisions.
3. Establishment Clause challenges in state courts
State courts play a significant role in interpreting the United States
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and,
consequently, the validity of their state's aid programs under the
Establishment Clause. Thus, it is essential to review the
Establishment Clause aid jurisprudence in state courts. State courts
might also review Establishment Clause claims where the United
States Supreme Court has refused to. For instance, while the
Supreme Court ruled on taxpayer standing for tax credit programs in
Winn, it did not address whether such programs violate the
Establishment Clause.25' The Supreme Court of Arizona, however,
considered this issue in Kotterman v. Killian. *
Kotterman involved an Arizona program that provided up to $500 in
annual tax credits for contributions to student tuition organizations
(STOs) that offered students scholarships to private schools,
including sectarian schools.5 Pursuant to the Lemon test, the
253. Id.
254. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 136-37.
255. 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
256. Unlike in Winn, the $500 maximum applied to both individuals and married
couples. Compare Winn, 563 U.S. at 130, with Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 609. Married
couples filing joint tax returns could claim up to $500, and those filing separately
13752016]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Arizona Supreme Court found that the tax credit program had at
least two secular purposes: (1) provision of educational options to
students and (2) support for the continued viability of private schools
to ensure quality education.5
Moreover, the court ruled that tax credits are not constitutionally
distinct from the tax deduction the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in
Mueller.2 5' As with the U.S. Supreme Court's tax deduction neutrality-
principle ruling in Mueller, the Arizona Supreme Court in Kotterman
found that the State's tax credit was one of many tax benefit options
for taxpayers in the statutory scheme.259 Additionally, the tax credits
here were generally available to a broad class of recipients defined
without regard to religion, as the tax deductions were in Mueller.2"
Indeed, any taxpayer could take advantage of the tax credit,
irrespective of whether the taxpayer had a child in school, as long as
the taxpayer donated to an STO. "
The tax credit program also satisfied the private-choice principle.'
The mediating private choices that the Arizona Supreme Court
found sufficient to preclude state imprimatur of religion included the
taxpayer's choice to donate to an STO, the taxpayer's choice on
amount to donate to an STO, the taxpayer's choice to take advantage
of the tax credit, the decision of individual parents to select the STOs
they donate to, the choice of individual parents to apply for STO
scholarships, and the choice of individual parents to use the
scholarships at sectarian schools.' These same mediating private
choices forestalled a finding of excessive entanglement because,
according to the court, the government was relegated to an "entirely
passive" role in a system run by taxpayers, parents, and STOs."
While the tax credit program might not create an incentive to
select sectarian schools, the court conceded that it could incentivize
taxpayers to donate to STOs: "This tax credit may provide incentive
could claim up to $250 each. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 609. Additionally, where a
taxpayer qualified for a tax credit that was more than taxes owed, he could use the
remaining credit each subsequent year for up to five years. Id. at 610.
257. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 611-12.
258. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-400 (1983); Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 612.
259. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 613; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
260. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 613; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397.
261. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 613 ("Arizona's class of beneficiaries is even broader
than that found acceptable in Mueller, and clearly achieves a greater level of
neutrality.").
262. Id. at 616.
263. Id. at 614.
264. Id. at 616.
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to donate, but there is no arm twisting here. Those who do not wish to
support the school tuition program are not obligated to do so. They
are free to take advantage of a variety of other tax benefits, or none at
all."2" The STOs thus provided the bridge between the tax credit
program and the sectarian schools, creating mediating private roles
that precluded attribution of the ultimate sectarian school benefit to
the government.2' Furthermore, similar to the Court's holding in
Mueller regarding tax deductions, the Supreme Court of Arizona
refused to base its tax credit decision on the number of taxpayers
taking advantage of the tax credit or the number of STO-scholarship
recipients choosing to use their scholarships at sectarian schools.
As evident above, when plaintiffs bring Establishment Clause cases,
they generally seek to preclude the participation of sectarian schools
in government aid programs.2 6 In Bagley v. Raymond School
Department,2 6 9 however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
confronted a different question: whether the Establishment Clause
actually requires inclusion of sectarian schools in government aid
programs.270  The Maine tuition program required school districts
without secondary schools to pay tuition for students to attend private
schools or other public schools. 27 1 Under the program, the tuition
was paid directly to the school.27 2 Sectarian schools were excluded
from participation in the program to assure compliance with the
Establishment Clause.2 " The court ruled that the Establishment
Clause has no applicability when government chooses not to aid
265. Id. at 615. The court also concluded it was immaterial that the challenged tax
credit program did not include public schools for eligible STO contributions. The
court arrived at this conclusion particularly because the local public schools do not
require scholarships or tuition payments and partly because there was another statute
that allowed tax credits for extracurricular expenses at public schools. Id. at 616.
266. Moreover, the court ruled that sectarian schools were "no more than indirect
recipients of taxpayer contributions, with the final destination of these funds being
determined by individual parents." Id. at 614. Consequently, "[t]he decision-making
process is completely devoid of state intervention or direction and protects against
the government 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement' that so
concerned the framers of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 614 (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
267. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1983); Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 614.
268. See, e.g., Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 130-32 (Me. 1999).
269. 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 130.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 130-31.
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sectarian purposes.27" As the court noted, the Establishment Clause
imposes no obligation on the State to provide government aid to
make one's exercise of religion easier or more accessible.7 Instead,
the Establishment Clause only precludes the government from
aiding, rather than refusing to aid, sectarian purposes.7
Another case in which a state court considered an Establishment
Clause challenge against a government aid program was Alabama
Education Ass'n v. James.2 7 7 In that case, the Supreme Court of
Alabama upheld a student grant program against an Establishment
Clause challenge.2 7' The program paid direct grants to private post-
secondary schools in support of students' education; however, the
grants could not be used at pervasively sectarian schools or for
sectarian purposes.27' The program had a secular purpose under the
Lemon test because it was designed to ensure thriving, quality private
schools; support private choice of schools and narrow cost gaps
between public and private schools.2 ' 0 Furthermore, the court ruled
that since the grant was generally available to all qualified students
and all qualified institutions, it satisfied the second prong of the
Lemon test; accordingly, sectarian institutions did not have to be
"quarantined" from the grants.28 ' Based on the character of the
recipient schools, the government aid program was also upheld
under the excessive-entanglement prong: unlike primary and
secondary schools, post-secondary schools have less impressionable
274. Id. at 136.
275. Id.
276. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held similarly in
upholding the Maine tuition program in a different case when it ruled,
[W]e are at a loss to understand why plaintiff-appellants believe that the
Establishment Clause gives them a basis for recovery. The Establishment Clause
forbids the making of a law respecting the establishment of any religion. There
is no relevant precedent for using its negative prohibition as a basis for extending
the right of a religiously affiliated group to secure state subsidies.
See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); see also id. at 60-64 (discussing
the court's Establishment Clause analysis).
277. 373 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. 1979).
278. Id. at 1079.
279. Id. at 1078.
280. See id. at 1079; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
281. James, 373 So. 2d at 1079-80 (citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426
U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The court also found that the program
satisfied the second prong because grants did not go to pervasively sectarian schools.
Id. at 1080.
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students, creating a less urgent need for government monitoring of
sectarian influences of the aid."
What is evident from these state cases is that the private-choice and
neutrality principles effectively present a near death knell to
Establishment Clause claims in state courts, as well as in federal
courts. It also amplifies the importance of plaintiffs' incorporating
other constitutional claims in any challenge to government aid
programs. The next section of this Article examines one of those
potential challenges-Free Exercise Clause claims.
C. Free Exercise Clause Challenges
In order to establish that government action violates the Free
Exercise Clause, four conditions must be established: (1) the
plaintiffs religious belief is sincerely held, (2) the government action
creates a substantial burden on the plaintiff's ability to fulfill a central
religious belief or practice, (3) the government has no compelling
interest justifying the burden, and (4) the least restrictive means to
the compelling interest is the government action.8 However, as
evidenced by the cases analyzed below, courts do not consistently
apply all four conditions. 84
282. Id.; cf Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The historic
barrier that has existed between church and state throughout the life of the Republic
has up to the present acted as an insurmountable impediment to the direct payments
or subsidies by the State to sectarian institutions, particularly in the context of
primary and secondary schools." (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-87
(1971) (plurality opinion))).
283. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1994); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852
F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944,
959 (Me. 2006) ("A burden upon religion exists when 'the state conditions receipt of
an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs.'" (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981)).
284. See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 (applying two of the four compelling
interests); cf Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 133 (Me. 1999). It is also
critical to keep in mind that a program "that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Anderson, 895 A.2d at
958 (citing Emp't Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80
(1990); Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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1. Free Exercise Clause challenges in the United States Supreme Court
In Locke v. Davey,"1 5 the Supreme Court considered whether
preventing students from using government aid for a sectarian
degree violates the Free Exercise Clause.2 8" The case involved a
Washington state program that offered scholarships from the state's
general funds to ease gifted students' educational financial
burdens.8 Students could use the scholarship at either public or
private schools.2 ' The program, however, prohibited students from
using the scholarship for a theology degree at any school.28 9  The
scholarship funds were distributed from the State to the school and
then to the student.' The plaintiff opted to use his scholarship
toward a degree in pastoral ministries and another in business
management; his sectarian college, however, declined to release
funds to him for the pastoral ministries degree, prompting the
lawsuit challenging the scholarship program's interdiction of funds
for a theology degree.
Finding no animus against religion in the program's exclusion of
government aid for the theology degree, the Supreme Court ruled
that the exclusion did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.9 In fact,
as the Court observed, the program allowed students to use their
scholarships at sectarian schools." Consequently, the exclusion
imposed a minimal burden on students." Further, the State had a
substantial interest in the exclusion given its intent to avoid the
possibility of an Establishment Clause violation.2 " This was a
heightened concern echoed in the state's constitution because it, like
those of many other states, prohibits use of taxpayer funds for
sectarian purposes." Moreover, these state constitutional
285. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
286. Id. at 715.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 716.
289. Id. (noting that "the statute simply codifies the State's constitutional
prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are devotional in
nature or designed to induce religious faith"); see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. The
participating schools were required to verify that the scholarship student was not
there for a theology degree. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
290. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
291. Id. at 717-18. The pastoral ministries degree was indubitably a theology
degree. Id. at 717.
292. Id. at 725.
293. Id. at 724.
294. Id. at 725.
295. Id. at 722, 725.
296. Id. at 723.
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prohibitions resulted from a desire to address fears of establishment
of religion through government support-fears that prevailed during
the nation's founding and underlie the Establishment Clause.
What Locke makes clear is that the Supreme Court is not opposed to
exclusion of sectarian schools from government aid programs; and
the Free Exercise Clause is not necessarily a viable vehicle for those
seeking to mandate inclusion of sectarian schools in government aid
programs unless the exclusion imposes a substantial burden on the
sectarian schools. Even with the Supreme Court ruling on
government aid programs under the Free Exercise Clause, state
courts often take on the role of interpreting and applying the
Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence to their state aid
programs. The next section of this Article discusses Free Exercise
Clause cases in state courts.
2. Free Exercise Clause challenges in state courts
One of the questions presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine in Bagley, discussed earlier, was whether the exclusion of
sectarian schools from the Maine tuition program violated the Free
Exercise Clause."' Recall that the program required school districts
with no secondary schools to pay the tuition of students who chose to
attend private schools or other public schools.' The plaintiffs
claimed that the program burdened their fundamental right to
educate their children in sectarian schools.o The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine found that, even though one of the plaintiffs
established a sincerely held religious belief, none proved that
sectarian education was a central religious belief.so'
Further, the court ruled that the government does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause simply by making it more expensive to fulfill a
religious belief or practice."' The Maine tuition program did not bar or
restrict parents from sending their children to sectarian schools; it only
297. Id. at 721-23.
298. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 133, 135 (Me. 1999); see supra
notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
299. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 130.
300. Id. at 133.
301. Id. at 134; see infra Section II.C. In its Free Exercise Clause analysis, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine conceded that the judiciary must exercise judicial
restraint in determining the centrality of a person's religious belief as there are few
clear guidelines available for such determinations; as such, the court only conducted
a cursory analysis on this issue. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 134.
302. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 134 (citing Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168,
171 (4th Cir. 1995); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
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made it more expensive for parents who chose to send their children to
such schools and paid out-of-pocket without the benefit of the tuition
program.os As the court aptly observed, "the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual,
not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government "30
Accordingly, the court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
require the Maine tuition program to fund sectarian education.0
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reaffirmed this holding in
Anderson v. Town of Durham"6 after certain parents asked the court to
reconsider its Bagley decision in light of the intervening Supreme
Court decisions in Zelman and Locke.' 7 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine noted, however, that Zelman and Locke actually reinforced its
Bagley decision." As the court observed, the Maine tuition program
simply barred government funding of sectarian school choice.3"
There was no evidence that the plaintiffs' exercise of their religion
was burdened, for they failed to show that the government aid
program pressured them to change their beliefs; penalized them for
conduct required by their faith; or prohibited them from attending
secular schools in violation of their faith." 0 Besides, the court ruled,
a government aid program "does not lose its neutrality and become
subject to strict scrutiny simply because it precludes state funding of a
religious educational choice. ""
For those seeking to challenge government aid in state courts
under the Free Exercise Clause, the key lesson from state court
treatment of such challenges can be summed up as follows: " [t] he
fact that government cannot exact from [a citizen] a surrender of
one iota of [her] religious scruples does not, of course, mean that
303. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 135.
304. Id. at 134-35. For the reasons given by the Bagley court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the Maine tuition program against a Free
Exercise Clause challenge in Strout v. Albanese. 178 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 1999).
305. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 135.
306. 895 A.2d 944 (Me. 2006).
307. Id. at 947-49, 959; supra notes 209-35 and accompanying text.
308. Anderson, 895 A.2d at 958-59 (holding that Zelman allowed the legislature to
extend tuition funding to sectarian schools and that Locke recognized that states may
have discretion not to fund sectarian schools even if a choice to fund religious
education indirectly might not violate the Establishment Clause).
309. Id. at 959.
310. Id.; see also Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 563
(Vt. 1999) (finding that a program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause if one is
not forced into a choice between following religious beliefs and foregoing
government benefits).
311. Anderson, 895 A.2d at 959.
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[she] can demand of government a sum of money, the better to
exercise them." 1 2 With little room for success with the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause, plaintiffs sometimes turn to the
Equal Protection Clause or include it as part of their Free Exercise
Clause claim when raising concerns about government aid to
sectarian schools. The next section examines Equal Protection
Clause cases challenging government aid to sectarian schools.
D. Equal Protection Clause Challenges
The Maine tuition program was also challenged in Bagley as
violating the Equal Protection Clause for its exclusion of sectarian
schools."' The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine characterized the
plaintiffs' Equal Protection challenge as "somewhat unusual" because
the plaintiffs did not claim that their children were denied education
available to others on the basis of their religion; rather, they claimed
that the program failed to fund their sectarian school choice.' The
court reviewed the program using the strict scrutiny standard, which
requires that, when a fundamental right is infringed or a suspect
classification is involved, courts must scrutinize the government
action to determine if it is narrowly-tailored to a compelling
government interest.315 Government use of religious classifications in
legislation, as well as infringement of the fundamental right to free
exercise of religion, demands strict scrutiny.' 6  As discussed in the
312. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 134 (Me. 1999) (quoting
Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas,J., concurring)).
313. Id. at 136; supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text.
314. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 136. As the court noted, the parents had choices of other
schools that would have been funded under the program, and they had more choices
for schooling that were unavailable in districts with a public high school. Moreover,
the plaintiffs acknowledged that there was no constitutional requirement that
districts with public high schools pay for sectarian high school education, and the
constitution did not bar the tuition program from paying only for public school
education if the State opted for that choice. Thus, the plaintiffs' Equal Protection
claim had a weak premise from the start. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted rights
of the sectarian school rather than their own. Nevertheless, the court decided to
review the Equal Protection Clause claim because it presented a vital issue. Id.
315. Id. at 136-37; see also JOSEPH OLUWOLE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
WHISTLEBLOWERS: TEACHERS AND OTHER PUBuc EMPLOYEES 135-50 (2008) (discussing
the history of the Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence); Joseph 0.
Oluwole, Revisiting Parents Involved v. Seattle School District: Race Consciousness and
the Government-Speech Doctrine, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 393, 410-11 (2013)
(describing the Equal Protection Clause review framework).
316. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 137-38 (citing Emp't Div., Dep't Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (explaining that when
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, courts apply
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previous section, the court ruled that the Maine tuition program did
not implicate the fundamental right to free exercise of religion;317 as
such, the Free Exercise Clause was not violated. *
The court instead examined the tuition program as a religious
classification under the strict scrutiny standard." 9 The state claimed
that it had a compelling interest in excluding sectarian schools from
the program in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.320 In
essence, the Equal Protection Clause violation hinged on whether
inclusion of sectarian schools would indeed violate the Establishment
Clause."' As the court observed, Maine had excluded religious schools
from the challenged tuition program because its initial program, which
provided direct payments to sectarian schools, included no measures
to assure that payments would only serve secular purposes.2 The
challenged program likewise made direct payments to beneficiary
secular schools and included no restrictions on the use of the funds;323
therefore, inclusion of sectarian schools within such a program would
violate Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedent. 24
The court ruled that, even though the program allowed parents to
choose schools, "choice alone cannot overcome the fact that the
tuition program would directly pay religious schools for programs
that include and advance religion."3 2 ' Besides, with no restrictions on
rational basis review, which requires a plaintiff to establish that the government
action is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest); see also OLUWOLE,
supra note 315, at 135-50; Oluwole, supra note 315, at 410-11 (describing rational
basis review).
317. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 137.
318. See supra notes 257-69 and accompanying text.
319. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 137-38.
320. Id. at 138.
321. Id. ("If the exclusion of religious schools is not required by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, it must be struck down because the State offers no
other reason for its existence. If the exclusion is required in order to comply with
the Establishment Clause, the State will have presented a compelling justification for
the disparate treatment of religious schools, and the parents' Equal Protection claim
will fail." (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981))).
322. Id. at 140. This exclusion decision by Maine was based on the United States
Supreme Court's Nyquist decision, which found unconstitutional a government aid
program that failed to include a mechanism for ensuring that government aid would
also serve secular purposes. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 791 (1973).
323. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 143-44.
324. Id. at 144-45 (mentioning cases such as Witters, Mueller, and Zobrest); see also
supra notes 100-80, 246-55 and accompanying text.
325. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 144 (emphasis added); see also id. at 144-45 ("The direct,
substantial, and unrestricted nature of the financial benefit provided to a recipient
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the use of the funds, including sectarian schools would have allowed
those schools to "supplant" rather than "supplement" expenses they
would otherwise be responsible for, creating a windfall.3 2' Ergo,
including sectarian schools would have a primary effect of advancing
religion in violation of the Lemon test's second prong. 2 1 Including
sectarian schools would also have created excessive entanglement
with religion due to the pervasive religious character of some of the
sectarian schools-the same character that caused the aid to violate
the Lemon test's second prong. 2" The court observed that "[i]n the
entire history of the Supreme Court's struggle to interpret the
Establishment Clause it has never concluded that such a direct,
unrestricted financial subsidy to a religious school could escape the
strictures of the Establishment Clause."3' Thus, Establishment
Clause concerns certainly justified Maine's excluding sectarian
schools from its program.
Even after the Supreme Court's Zelman decision post-Bagley, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit echoed the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine's Bagley decision, ruling that the Maine
tuition program could continue to exclude sectarian schools without
school is starkly demonstrated by the record in this case."); see also Strout v. Albanese,
178 F.3d 57, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]here is no binding authority for the
proposition that the direct payment of tuition by the state to a private sectarian school
is constitutionally permissible.").
326. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 145 ("According to the calculations of the Department of
Education, if Cheverus [a sectarian school that would have benefited from the
program] had been approved to receive tuition under the program, it could have
received up to $5,379.63 per student, per year. The 1997-1998 tuition for a student
attending Cheverus was $5,450. Thus, the tuition program would have covered
almost the entire payment expected from parents. While the standard tuition
payment at Cheverus does not cover the entire cost to the school per student, it does
cover approximately 70% of those costs. That kind of direct cash aid from the State
to a religious institution is neither the 'attenuated financial benefit' approved in
Mueller nor 'aid that directly aids [only] the educational functions' approved in
Agostini. ... Full tuition payments to a religious school such as Cheverus would
provide a direct, not attenuated, benefit and would directly aid the religious as well
as the educational functions of the school."); accord Strout, 178 F.3d at 64 (noting that
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation provided a compelling interest under
the strict scrutiny standard for Equal Protection Clause analysis).
327. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 145, 147.
328. The court noted that, even though the State required program beneficiaries
to submit documents and reports to the State for review, an excessive entanglement
determination could not be made based on this monitoring relationship because the
record before the court was not fully developed on this issue. Id. at 146. The court
acknowledged, however, an "appearance of ... an excessive entanglement." Id.
329. Id. at 147.
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violating the federal Constitution. In Eulitt v. Maine, Department of
Education,"' the court ruled that Zelman did not change the fact that,
for Equal Protection Clause claims, the right at issue is the
fundamental right to free exercise of religion."3 As the court stated, if
this fundamental right or religious animus is not implicated, then only
rational basis review applies, which would almost certainly guarantee
the constitutionality of the program's sectarian-school exclusion.3
Because the program did not bar parents from choosing religious
schools for their children, it did not substantially burden their
religious beliefs or practices. Accordingly, the fundamental right
to free exercise was not implicated.3 Moreover, the court rejected
the appellants' argument that their right to practice their religious
beliefs was substantially burdened because of the financial burden
imposed on those attending sectarian schools compared to students
that attended non-sectarian schools and were eligible for the state's
tuition program.33 ' As the court noted, there is no constitutional
requirement that the government fund a parent's choice of a
sectarian school in order to make the practice of the parent's
religious beliefs easier.33 ' The court ruled that governments could
justify excluding sectarian schools from government programs by
showing that the exclusion was grounded in an effort to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause.
To determine whether the Maine program violated the
Establishment Clause, the court investigated the justification for
excluding sectarian schools. The court found no religious animus in
the program's exclusion of sectarian schools for the following
330. Eulitt v. Me., Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 346 (1st Cir. 2004). The court
stated that Zelman "altered the landscape of Establishment Clause jurisprudence" in
upholding a voucher program based on the neutrality principle and the private-choice
principle. Id. at 348. Yet the court declared it "fairly debatable whether or not the
Maine tuition program could survive an Establishment Clause challenge [after Zelman]
if the state ... allowed sectarian schools to receive tuition funds." Id. at 349.
331. 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004).
332. Id. at 350-51, 353.
333. Id. at 350-51, 353, 355-56; see id. at 356 ("Like any other challenger
confronting rational basis review, they must rule out every plausible rationale that
might support the law at issue. Under the best of circumstances, this is a steep uphill
climb for a plaintiff." (citations omitted)).
334. Id. at 354.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. (basing this conclusion on the Supreme Court's ruling in Locke); see supra
notes 285-97 and accompanying text.
338. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 355.
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reasons: (1) the program included no criminal or civil penalty for
following religious belief or practice; (2) the program did not preclude
political participation on account of religious belief or practice; and
(3) the program did not force people into a choice between adhering
to religious belief or practice and receiving a government benefit-
there was no evidence the plaintiffs' religious beliefs required them to
educate their children in sectarian schools."'
Peter v. Wedl.s. was another case that involved an Equal Protection
challenge to a government aid program." In that case, parents of a
severely disabled student filed suit after their local school district
refused to provide him a full-time paraprofessional to support his
educational needs at a sectarian school." The district claimed that it
followed state law, which clearly prohibited providing government-
funded special education services at sectarian schools. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the state law
prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause because it "explicitly
discriminated against" sectarian school students.34" This
discrimination, the court explained, was evident in the fact that the
law only excluded sectarian school students while allowing
government-funded services at secular private schools.
In determining the constitutionality of the Minnesota program, the
Wedl court was forced to assess the protections guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause against the Establishment Clause's
prohibitions. The court ruled that "[a] law declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection
of the laws in the most literal sense."" Because the law was facially
discriminatory, the court reviewed whether it could be justified by the
State's asserted compelling interest-prevention of an Establishment
Clause violation.34 7 In this regard, the court ruled that provision of
special education services at a sectarian school presents no threat of
an Establishment Clause violation in light of Supreme Court
precedent such as Zobrest.348 The problem with the court's reasoning
339. Id.
340. 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
341. Id. at 994.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 994-95.
344. Id. at 996.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 996-97.
348. Id. at 997.
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is that Zobrest merely held that government aid could be used to
provide services at sectarian schools without violating the
Establishment Clause." It did not hold that the federal Constitution
requires the government to provide aid to sectarian schools. As such,
the Wedl court should not have used Zobrest as rationale to allow
government aid at sectarian schools. The Wedl court seemed aware of
the correct interpretation of the Supreme Court's Zobrest view even
though it failed to apply it to the Establishment Clause part of its
Equal Protection Clause analysis. Indeed, this awareness is evident in
the court quoting a Supreme Court ruling that clearly weakens the
Wedl court's Zobrest rationale:
It has never been held that if private schools are not given some
share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are
isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the
maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such
schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. 50
Moreover, if we follow the Wedl decision to its logical end, then all
government programs discussed in this Article that prohibited
government aid to sectarian schools would be unconstitutional and
based on "religious animus." 3 5
Jackson v. Benson3 5 1 was another case that considered an Equal
Protection Clause challenge to a government aid program.5 In that
case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Equal Protection
Clause challenge to the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program-the
nation's first voucher program.' The NAACP argued that the
voucher program would increase segregation within Milwaukee
Public Schools, given the .disparate racial composition of the
Milwaukee Public Schools relative to those of private schools likely to
benefit from the voucher program. The court pointed out that the
NAACP presented no evidence showing that the voucher program
349. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
350. Wedl, 155 F.3d at 1002 (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462
(1973)). The court cited this Supreme Court statement in the section of the case
focused on the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim, a claim the court chose not to
rule on. Id. at 1002.
351. Id. at 998 (pointing to "the religious animus contained in [the] Minnesota
Rule").
352. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
353. Id. at 609.
354. Id. at 630.
355. Id. at 631.
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was created with discriminatory intent.5 ' The NAACP also failed to
present evidence that the participating private schools were
discriminating on the basis of race.5 Indeed, as the court noted, the
voucher program expressly required participating private schools to
comply with federal anti-discrimination laws. 5 It also required those
schools to admit students based on random selection, further
undermining the NAACP's racial discrimination claim.5 While the
court acknowledged that invidious racial intent could be implied in
cases of disparate program impact on a specific race, there was no
evidence in the record that the program had such an impact.31
Accordingly, the NAACP's Equal Protection claim failed.'
As plaintiffs increasingly find little to no viable claims under the
Federal Constitution against government aid programs, they often
turn to state constitutional provisions, which often have clearer and
sometimes more explicit prohibitions against government aid
programs benefitting sectarian and secular private schools. State
constitutional grounds for such claims are discussed in the next
section of this Article.
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO VOUCHERS AND TAX
BENEFITS
After the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, greenlighting voucher
programs under the federal Constitution,6 opponents of government
aid programs looked to state constitutions to halt these programs.3 3
This section examines state constitutional challenges against vouchers
356. Id.
357. Id. at 631.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 631-32.
361. Id. at 632.
362. See supra notes 228-45 and accompanying text.
363. Kemerer, supra note 9. Pertinent to this move by opponents to halt these
programs is that at least 78% of private schools in the United States are sectarian
schools. Id.
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and tax benefits," some being religion-based challenges under no aid
clauses-sometimes referred to as Blaine Amendments.
United States Senator James G. Blaine introduced the original
Blaine Amendment during the forty-fourth Congress as a
Constitutional amendment to prevent government funding of
sectarian schools.3" The amendment provided that
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any
religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.3 6 7
Some critics of the Blaine Amendment claim that, because it was
proposed during a time of intense concerns about burgeoning
Catholic education-an era in which government support of
Protestant education was more generally acceptable-it was primarily
grounded in "anti-Catholic animus."1s36 As government aid continued
364. Constitutional provisions in states, such as California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Montana, New York, and Oklahoma, prohibit direct and indirect
government aid to sectarian schools, while the Michigan Constitution explicitly
prohibits not only direct and indirect aid but also vouchers. Id. On the other hand,
states, such as Massachusetts, have constitutional provisions that simply dictate that
aid only go to public schools. Id.
365. See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L.
REV. 295, 295-96, 310 (2008) (noting that the "[f]unding of religious education
violated nonestablishment in three ways, according to contemporaries: it violated
rights of conscience to force one person to pay for another's religious instruction; it
would bring about religious dissension over the competition for funds; and it would
result in ecclesiastical control over public monies").
366. William P. Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case
Study in Religious Freedom in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REv. 509, 526-27 (1998). The Blaine
Amendment was introduced in 1876, seven years after the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification. Id. at 526. It was intended to apply the Establishment Clause to the
states, as the Fourteenth Amendment had not been interpreted at the time as
applying the First Amendment to the states. Green, supra note 365, at 295; see Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256-58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the Religious Freedom Clause's application to the states
based on the Framers' intent). In fairness, Senator Blaine's daughters attended
Catholic school, his mother was Catholic, and he denied any anti-Catholic bigotry.
Jill Goldenziel, Blaine's Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable
Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 57, 64 (2005).
367. Goldenziel, supra note 366, at 64 (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine
Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 38, 53 n.9 (1992)).
368. See Green, supra note 365, at 295, 315-16 ("Catholic requests for a share of
the public school funds were fiercely opposed by public officials, educators, and
Protestant leaders. Protestant nativists seized on the no-funding principle as a tool to
maintain Protestant hegemony in the culture and the schools and used charges of
papal designs to fuel anti-Catholic bigotry. The ensuing funding conflict resulted in
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flowing to Catholic immigrants for Catholic school education, non-
Catholics rallied against the funding, culminating in the Blaine
Amendment.' The sponsors of the amendment saw it as "a political
device designed to maintain (or regain) Republican political
hegemony"7 0 by rallying constituents, including Protestants, against
an influx of immigrants-especially Catholics who were viewed as
illiterate and uncultured.3 11 After the amendment failed to pass in
religious suspicion, acrimony, dissension, and violence in many eastern cities."); cf
Hollman, supra note 9, at 13-14, 16-18; Ellen Johnson, Panelist Statement, School
Choice: The Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism, U.S. COMM'N Civ. RIGHTS 23, 26, 29
(2007), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/BlaineReport.pdf (disagreeing with the notion
that the state amendments were driven by anti-Catholic animus). Justices Breyer,
Souter, and Stevens, however, have recognized anti-Catholic animus as the origin of
the Blaine Amendment:
Catholics sought equal government support for the education of their
children in the form of aid for private Catholic schools. But the Protestant
position on this matter, scholars report, was that public schools must be
nonsectarian (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other
Protestant observances) and public money must not support sectarian
schools (which in practical terms meant Catholic). And this sentiment
played a significant role in creating a movement that sought to amend
several state constitutions (often successfully), and to amend the United
States Constitution (unsuccessfully) to make certain that government would
not help pay for sectarian (i.e., Catholic) schooling for children.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 (2002) (Breyer,J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
369. Goldenziel, supra note 366, at 63; Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Panelist
Statement, School Choice: The Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism, U.S. COMM'N Civ.
RIGHTS 5 (2007), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/BlaineReport.pdf; see also Laycock,
supra note 44, at 56-59 (observing that these anti-Catholic sentiments existed even
around the time of the Lemon test and that many evangelicals who oppose the Lemon
test today supported it at the time of its creation).
370. Green, supra note 365, at 322. A Blaine Amendment supporter characterized
the Democratic Party, which opposed the amendment, as "the party of Rum,
Romanism, and Rebellion." Laycock, supra note 44, at 52 (citation omitted).
371. Green, supra note 365, at 321-22; see Laycock, supra note 44, at 52 ("Badly
tainted by anti-Catholicism, these debates produced instead a nativist Protestant
victory over Catholic immigrants. There was only a pretense of neutrality; the end
result sustained a Protestant establishment in the public schools at public expense,
with no relief for religious minorities. Major Jewish groups responded with their
long effort to secularize the public schools. Catholics continued their long effort to
build and finance private schools. Anti-Catholicism continued; the most extreme
achievement of the attack on Catholic schools was Oregon's law to close all private
schools, struck down in 1925."); see also Richard D. Komer, Panelist Statement, School
Choice: The Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism, U.S. COMM'N CIv. RIGHTS, 31, 33-34
(2007), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/BlaineReport.pdf (discussing the battle between
Protestants and Catholics).
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Congress,372 some states opted to enact their own version of the
amendment to protect their public school systems, prevent sectarian
competition for government funds, and assure public fund
integrity. 7' Besides being referred to as Blaine Amendments, these
state amendments are sometimes called "Baby Blaines." 374
In at least one case on record, plaintiffs have attempted to
challenge a tax credit program under the federal Blaine Amendment.
In Kottenan v. Killian, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the
contention that the state's tax credit program was invalid pursuant to
the federal Blaine Amendment for, as the court observed, the
amendment failed to pass.7 Moreover, even though several states
have a provision similar to the Blaine Amendment, Arizona is not one
of them. This further undermined the plaintiffs' credibility in a
constitutional claim based on non-existent federal and state
constitutional amendments. 376  Indeed, seemingly agitated by the
plaintiffs' argument, as well as the entire Blaine Amendment
historical narrative, the court characterized the Blaine Amendment
372. Green, supra note 365, at 295-96. The Blaine Amendment passed in the
House of Representatives but fell four votes short in the Senate. Steven K Green,
The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38 (1992).
373. Wyoming's Blaine Amendment is unique because it prohibits use of
government funds to support individuals and not just schools or institutions. As a
result, it appears that the private-choice principle cannot even penetrate through the
state's Blaine Amendment's strict language. See WYo. CONST. art. III, § 36 ("No
appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent
purposes to any person, corporation or community not under the absolute control of
the State, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution or association."
(emphasis added)).
374. See Goldenziel, supra note 366, at 61, 66-68 (noting that the actual number of
Baby Blames in existence is unknown because the term is often applied
indiscriminately to state constitutional provisions that preclude funding for religious
education in an effort to attach anti-Catholic bigotry to such provisions); cf Komer,
supra note 371, at 32 (explaining that Blaine Amendments are "provisions found in
[thirty-seven] state constitutions that prohibit state and local governments from
providing aid to 'sectarian' or religious institutions, particularly schools"); Blaine
Amendments, THE BEcKETr FUND FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS, http://www.becketfund.
org/blaineamendments-old/ (indicating thirty-seven states have Blaine
Amendments); Anti-Defamation League, Additional Statement, School Choice: The
Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism, U.S. COMM'N CIv. RIGHTS, 47, 48, 53-54 (2007),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/BlaineReport.pdf (identifying and tabulating thirty-
eight states with Blaine Amendments as well as the dates of their adoption). What
appears clear, however, is that "the state constitutions of all states established after
1876 contain Blaine Amendments." Komer, supra note 371, at 32.
375. 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc); see supra notes 255-67 (discussing
Kotterman v. Killian).
376. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
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as a "crusade" born of "religious bigotry" against Catholics with no
applicability to the tax credit program.7
The next subsection of this Article examines cases that have
addressed religion-based challenges to government aid programs,
including those challenges under extant state Blaine Amendments-
no aid clauses-and compelled support clauses.
A. Religion-Based Challenges
The Kotterman tax credit program was challenged under two
religion clauses in the Arizona Constitution.' One clause provides
that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the
support of any religious establishment."' The other clause provides
that "[n] o tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in
aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service
corporation." 0 As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court of Arizona
has declared that the state has no Blaine Amendment; accordingly,
these religion clauses are not Blaine Amendments.8'
Additionally, the court held that the Kotterman tax credits did not
constitute either public property or public money under either
religion clause."' This is because no property or money came into
government control under the tax credit program."8 This fact keys
the distinction between government expenditures and tax credits:
while government expenditures involve money or property already in
government control, tax credits do not.-" The court rejected the
377. Id.
378. Id. at 617. Note that, even though these two clauses do not read like the
United States Constitution's Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court of Arizona
has indicated that the state constitution's prohibition of government aid for sectarian
purposes is not necessarily stricter than that of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 621-
22. However, the Supreme Court of Arizona has also declared that
Kotterman. . . [does] not compel us to interpret the [a]id [c]lause as a mirror
image of the [r]eligion [c]lause or to interpret the [a]id [c]lause as no
broader than the federal Establishment Clause. More importantly, both.the
text and purpose of the [a] id [c] lause support the conclusion that the clause
requires a construction independent from that of the [r] eligion [c] lause.
Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1182 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); see also id. at 1182-83
(discussing the distinctions between Arizona's aid clause and its religion clause).
379. AluZ. CONST. art. 2, § 12.
380. Id. art. IX, § 10.
381. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
382. Id. at 617-18.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 618-19.
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State's assertion that it had "quasi-ownership" of taxpayer money
claimed as tax credits because the money might have ended up in the
state treasury. 3 Such an assertion, the court explained, is a
dangerous proposition as it suggests that all taxpayer money or
property that could be taxed constitutes state property; after all, all
money or property could similarly end up in the state treasury based
on this assertion. 386  The court refused to accept this assertion,
however, as it threatened to effectively obliterate any distinction
between private and public monetary ownership."' Accordingly, the
court ruled that "[i] t is far more reasonable to say that funds remain
in the taxpayer's ownership at least until final calculation of the
amount actually owed to the government, and upon which the state
has a legal claim." 55
Additionally, for the same reasons that the Supreme Court of
Arizona rejected the characterization of tax credits as public money
or property, it also ruled that tax credits do not constitute
appropriations under either religion clause."'9 As a companion
point, the court observed that only the legislature can appropriate
public funds for the executive branch to use for a specified
purpose.' In essence, an appropriation involves government
spending, in contrast to a tax credit, which is a reduction in taxpayer
liability and money that never enters public revenue.3 9 ' Further,
since the tax credits did not constitute appropriations, the tax credit
program did not violate the second religion clause mentioned above,
which makes it unconstitutional to appropriate public money to
support any private school.392 Also, since the tax credit was not a tax
levy, the religion clause's prohibition of a tax levy to support private
schools was inapplicable.
385. Id. at 618.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 617-20. The court declared, "For us to agree that a tax credit
constitutes public money would require a finding that state ownership springs into
existence at the point where taxable income is first determined, if not before. The
tax on that amount would then instantly become public money." Id. at 618.
388. Id. at 618.
389. Id. at 618, 620.
390. Id. at 620.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 621.
393. See id. ("We cannot say that the legislature has somehow imposed a tax by
declining to collect potential revenue from its citizens. Nor does this credit amount
to the laying of a tax by causing an increase in the tax liability of those not taking
advantage of it.").
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The Supreme Court of Arizona likewise found that the tax credit
program did not violate the first religion clause, which prohibits
appropriation of public property or money for "any religious worship,
exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious
establishment."13 In so holding, the court found that the tax credit
program afforded parents, as taxpayers, ample choice over religious
donations and where their children attended school. 1 5  This, the
court reasoned, fulfilled the private-choice principle.' The terms of
the program also satisfied the neutrality principle, further removing
state imprimatur when sectarian schools benefitted from STO
donations and attendant tax credits.
Arizona's scholarship program for students with disabilities-
Empowerment Scholarship Accounts, or "ESAs"-was challenged in
Niehaus v. Huppenthal13 1 for violating the state constitution's religion
clause.3 " The program provided students with disabilities
scholarships, worth up to 90% of the cost the State would have
otherwise spent to educate the student at a public school, to attend
private schools meeting certain curriculum standards.4 00 As long as
their children were on scholarship, parents were prohibited from
enrolling their children in any public school and were required to
release their local district from educational obligations to their
children.40 ' In its review of the program, the Arizona Court of
Appeals interpreted the state's religion clause in line with the federal
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.0 Thereupon, the court ruled
that, since parents had the exclusive choice of private schools for
their children, any benefits flowing to sectarian schools were too
attenuated to be attributable to government action.403
The court also determined that the program created neither a
preference for sectarian schools over private schools, nor a
preference for particular sectarian schools over others.4 ' The court
concluded that the program created no incentive to attend sectarian
394. ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 12.
395. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 620.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
399. Aluz. CONST. art. 2, § 12; Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 985.
400. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 984. The parents could also use the scholarship for
educational therapy services or tutoring. Id. at 984-85.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 986-87.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 987.
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schools.1115  Indeed, because the program required participating
parents to forfeit their children's rights to a public education and that
the scholarship covered only 90% of the cost of public education, the
program arguably provided a disincentive to choose private school
education."' The court also found that the program satisfied the
neutrality principle because it was generally available to students with
special needs without defining recipients by religion.0 7 Thus, based
on the private-choice and neutrality principles, the court concluded
that the program did not violate the state's religion clause."
As with Arizona, Illinois' tax credit program was challenged as
unconstitutional under the state constitution's religious provisions."0 '
In pertinent part, the first religion clause provides that "[n]o person
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of
worship against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law
to any religious denomination or mode of worship.""o The second
religion clause provides that
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township,
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in
aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or
sustain any school, [or] academy ... controlled by any church or
sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation
of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by the
State, or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose."
Under the Illinois tax credit program, taxpayers could claim up to
$500 for 25% of tuition, textbooks, and lab expenses for public or
private school education."' The plaintiffs contended that the
program violated both religion clauses because most of the qualified
405. Because the absence of incentives suggested that parents made truly
independent private choices in selecting schools for their children, the court also
concluded that the program satisfied the private-choice principle. Id.
406. See id. at 984, 989 (setting forth the program requirements); cf id. at 989
("Parents are free to enroll their children in the public school or to participate in the
ESA [Empowerment Scholarship Accounts]; the fact that they cannot do both at the
same time does not amount to a waiver of their constitutional rights or coercion by
the state.").
407. Id. at 987.
408. Id.
409. Griffith v. Bower, 747 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
410. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
411. Id. art. X, § 3.
412. Bower, 747 N.E.2d at 425.
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beneficiary schools were sectarian." Plaintiffs believed that the tax
credit was a risky expenditure because the program did not limit
sectarian schools' use of tuition, which they believed would lead to
increased taxes." The appellate court disagreed, ruling that the tax
credits did not constitute an expenditure because they did not result
in any money entering into state coffers. Rather than constituting
appropriations, taxpayers were simply allowed to "keep more of their
own money.""' Additionally, choosing to apply the Lemon test to its
state's religion clauses, the court ruled that the tax credit satisfied
both the private-choice principle and the neutrality principle.4 1 7
In Toney v. Bower,418 Illinois' tax credit program was also challenged
as unconstitutional under the state constitution's no aid clause, which
provides that the government shall not "make any appropriation or
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or
sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever.""'
The state allowed taxpayers to deduct 25% of their expenses between
$250 and $500 for tuition, book, and lab fees as tax credits for each
child younger than twenty-one years old enrolled at a public or
private school. "2 The appellate court ruled that the tax credits did
not constitute an "appropriation" or a "public fund" under the no aid
clause."' The court characterized a public fund as government
money or government revenue; an appropriation, the court defined,
is the setting aside of money from government revenue for a
particular purpose. 2 2 Tax credits, on the other hand, involve the
government allowing taxpayers to keep more of the taxpayer's own
money by authorizing the taxpayer to deduct a certain sum from his
total tax obligation. 23 Since the tax credits never entered into the
government's possession, the court ruled that they did not fall within
the ambit of the no aid clause's prohibition.2
413. Id. at 425-26.
414. Id. at 426.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. 744 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
419. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 356.
420. Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 355.
421. Id. at 357-58.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 357.
424. Id.
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The tax credit program was also challenged under Illinois' religion
clause, which states that "[n]o person shall be required to attend or
support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship."2 5 The appellate court ruled that this clause was the functional
equivalent of the federal Establishment Clause, and its interpretation
tracks the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause interpretation.4 26
Pursuant to the first prong of the Lemon test, the court found that
the tax credit program had secular purposes: (1) adequate education
for all students and (2) financial viability for private schools, as those
schools mitigate the tax burden and state expenditure for educating
private schools students in public schools. Under the second
prong, the court observed that the tax credits were generally available
to taxpayers without definition by religion; additionally, sectarian
schools merely received attenuated benefits from the tax credits
because parents made a private, independent choice of schools. 28
Finally, the tax credit program satisfied the excessive entanglement
prong because monitoring the program to ensure the legitimacy of
tax credit claims was already standard practice for other tax credits
and deductions in the state."
The Supreme Court of Nebraska invalidated a government grant
program in State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson" that paid tuition for
students to attend private schools."' The program was challenged
under a constitutional provision that prohibits the State from making
"any appropriation from any public fund .. . in aid of any sectarian or
denominational school or college, or any educational institution
which is not exclusively owned and controlled by the state.""2
Though the grant was paid to the student rather than the school, the
court ruled that the program was simply a "conduit" for the funds to
get to the schools."3 3  After all, the program was created out of
solvency concerns about private schools greatly below capacity in
student enrollment. 434 For these reasons, the court ruled that the
425. ILL. CONST. art I, § 3; Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 357.
426. Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 358-60.
427. Id. at 362.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 362-63.
430. 219 N.W.2d 726 (Neb. 1974).
431. Id. at 729.
432. Id. (quoting NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11).
433. Id. at 730.
434. Id. at 730-31.
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grant program constituted an unconstitutional appropriation of
government funds in support of sectarian schools. 3 5
In Simmons-Harris v. Goff,3 1 previously discussed in this Article, the
Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the Cleveland voucher program
against constitutional challenge to the state's school funds clause. 3 1
This clause provides that "no religious or other sect, or sects, shall
ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school
funds of this state."438 The court found that sectarian schools
participating in the voucher program did not have exclusive right to
or control of the state's school funds, even though those schools
received state funds under the voucher program.4 9  The court
reasoned that, because the sectarian schools only received the funds
as a result of the private independent choices of parents, exclusive
right or control of the funds could not be attributed to the
government.o Besides, it was impossible under the program for
funds to flow directly to the sectarian schools without the private,
mediating choices of parents and students."'
Colorado's Douglas County School District's voucher program was
challenged in Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas County School
District"' as unconstitutional under the state's no aid clause."
Colorado's clause is very similar to Illinois' clause:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township,
school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any
appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever,
anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any
sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school [or]
academy ... controlled by any church or sectarian denomination
414whatsoever ....
435. Id. at 733.
436. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
437. Id. at 207. For a discussion of the Cleveland voucher program, see supra
Section II.B.3.
438. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
439. Goff 711 N.E.2d at 212.
440. Id.
441. See id. (interpreting the statute to hold that "no money can reach a sectarian
school based solely on its efforts or the efforts of the state").
442. 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015).
443. Id. at 466.
444. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d at 470. The
Supreme Court of Colorado refused to review this no aid clause as a Blaine
Amendment despite the defendants' insistence. Id. at 471. The court, however,
ruled that Colorado's no aid clause is more restrictive than the federal Establishment
Clause. Id. at 474.
2016] 1399
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEw
Douglas County School District created the Choice Scholarship
Pilot Program to help district students pay to attend partnering
private schools."4 About 93% of voucher recipients attended
sectarian schools and sixteen of the twenty-three partner schools were
sectarian schools.446 While partner schools could maintain their pre-
existing admission standards, they were required to administer
district assessment tests to their students.4 4 7
Despite their actual enrollment in private schools, voucher
students were required to enroll in a nominal charter school,
allowing the district to count the students in its total enrollment for
purposes of receiving state funding." The district kept 25% of its
per pupil revenue from the state and remitted 75% to the private
school in a check that the parent had to restrictively endorse to the
school for tuition."' As the Supreme Court of Colorado pointed out,
the voucher program was effectively "a recruitment program, teaming
with various religious schools (i.e., the Private School Partners) and
encouraging students to attend those schools via the inducement of
scholarships."4 o5  As such, the voucher program did "support or
sustain any school [or] academy ... controlled by any church or
sectarian denomination whatsoever" in contravention of the no aid
clause's plain language.5 Even though the voucher program
incorporated parental private choice, the no aid clause's blanket
prohibition of government aid to sectarian schools made private
choice immaterial.452 For the same reason, the court also found the
direct or indirect nature of aid immaterial.
The court found it troubling that the voucher program did not bar
sectarian schools from profiting from the program by simply raising
voucher students' tuition rates or lowering the students' financial aid
by the voucher amount. The court's concern was merited because
profiting would directly benefit a sectarian school and constitute
support or sustenance of a sectarian school in violation of the no aid
clause.4 54  Additionally, the fact that the voucher program allowed
445. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d at 470.
446. Id. at 466.
447. Id. at 465.
448. Id. (emphasizing that the charter school had no curriculum, teachers, or
buildings).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 470.
451. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d at 470, 475.
452. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d at 470-71.
453. Id. at 470.
454. Id. at 471.
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admission decisions to be based on religion and did not preclude
funding of religious activities at schools, justifiably placed the Choice
Scholarship Pilot Program on constitutionally-shaky ground.4 55
Besides no aid clauses, another basis for religion-based challenges
in state constitutions are compelled support clauses. Compelled
Support provisions are state constitutional provisions rooted in
Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which was
enacted into law in Virginia in 1786 with broad Protestant support
and subsequently added to the state's constitution.4 56 These
provisions prohibit a state from compelling anyone to support or
attend religious worship.
The Supreme Court of Vermont invalidated a district's tuition
reimbursement program under the state constitution's compelled
support clause in Chittenden Town School District v. Department of
Education. 5  The clause states in pertinent part that "no person
ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship,
or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister,
contrary to the dictates of conscience."459 Under the program, pursuant to
state law, school districts without a high school could pay tuition for
students to attend another school district's high school or a private
school.4" The state law did not mention anything about sectarian
education and did not limit use of government funds under the
program to secular purposes. 6' The Chittenden Town School
District, however, allowed parents to choose a sectarian school as
their children's private school.6
One of the beneficiaries of the district's program was a pervasively
religious school where both students and teachers were heavily
engrossed in the religious identity of the school.6 Since the
Chittenden Town School District did not restrict the beneficiary
schools' use of the tuition reimbursement, pervasively religious
schools could use the funds to support sectarian education." After
455. Id. at 472.
456. Goldenziel, supra note 366, at 64-65.
457. Id.
458. 738 A.2d 539, 563-64 (Vt. 1999).
459. Id. at 547 (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3); see also id. at 562 ("[W]e see no way
to separate religious instruction from religious worship. The limited record we have
before us indicates that there is no line between these concepts.").
460. Id. at 542.
461. Id. at 545.
462. Id. at 542.
463. Id. at 542-43.
464. Id. at 545-46.
2016] 1401
AMERICAN UNIVERSfIY LAW REVIEW
the state commissioner of education learned of the district's program,
the district's state aid was cut off, prompting the district to bring suit
seeking a court judgment that its program complied with the
compelled support clause.1 65 The court ruled that the district's failure
to include safeguards or restrictions in the tuition program against the
use of government aid for sectarian purposes doomed the program.6
As the court noted, there was a real risk under the program that
government aid would fund sectarian education, even pervasively
sectarian education."'6 The court also ruled that the private-choice
principle could not remedy this constitutional defect."*
The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld Indiana's voucher
program-Choice Scholarship Program-against a compelled
support clause challenge in Meredith v. Perce.4 " The clause provides that
"no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of
worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent. "70 The
program provided low-income families with vouchers that were capped at
90% of the tuition amount the public school would otherwise receive for
the student.7 1 Most of the participating private schools were sectarian
schools.17 ' Beyond requiring the participating private schools to meet
minimum educational standards applicable to public schools, the
program did not regulate the schools' religious activities or curricula. 73
The voucher payments were remitted to the school-after the school and
parents endorsed the voucher-with no limits on the school's use of the
funds.4 74  The Supreme Court of Indiana cursorily dismissed the
challenge, noting that the compelled support clause merely "prohibited
government compulsion of individuals and was neither intended nor
understood to limit government expenditures." 7 1
The Indiana voucher program was also challenged under the state's
no aid clause, which provides that "[n] o money shall be drawn from the
465. Id. at 543.
466. Id. at 562-63.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 563. The court.also signaled that, in analyzing its state constitution, it
would not use the private-choice principle as it is used for the Federal Constitution's
Establishment Clause. Id.
469. 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1216-17, 1219 (Ind. 2013).
470. IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1225.
471. Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1219.
472. Id. at 1220.
473. Id. at 1219.
474. Id. at 1220.
475. Id. at 1226.
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treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.""
The court found that the voucher program satisfied the two-pronged
review for determining if a government aid program violates the no aid
clause: (1) whether the voucher program's expenditures are for
benefits prohibited by the no aid clause and (2) whether eligible schools
constitute "religious or theological institution [s]." "
A program fails the first prong if the government expenditure
directly benefits a theological or religious institution.' If the
government expenditure indirectly benefits the theological or
religious institution, as happens when the government provides the
institution police and fire services, the primary beneficiary is the
general public or the segment of the general public associated with
the institution."' Along this line of reasoning, the court ruled that
"the principal actors and direct beneficiaries under the voucher
program are neither the State nor program-eligible schools, but
lower-income Indiana families with school-age children."4 80 Chiefly,
the court ruled that, pursuant to the private-choice principle, when a
program authorizes parents to exercise independent private choice,
the benefit to the school is indirect and incidental."'
Under the second prong, the court concluded that sectarian
schools participating in the voucher program did not constitute
"religious or theological institutions. "4 At the time the State adopted
the no aid clause, sectarian schools were the primary avenues for
primary and secondary education in Indiana. 83  Given their
widespread nature, the court determined that the no aid clause could
not have been "intended to prohibit government support of primary
and secondary education which at the time included a substantial
religious component." 8  In sum, since the voucher program satisfied
the two-pronged review for determining violation of the no aid
clause, it withstood the constitutional challenge."
476. IND. CONST. art. I, § 6.
477. Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1227.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1227 ("To hold otherwise would put at constitutional risk every
government expenditure incidentally, albeit substantially, benefiting any religious or
theological institution.").
480. Id. at 1228.
481. Id. at 1228-29.
482. Id. at 1229-30.
483. Id. at 1230 ("It was generally accepted that the teaching of religious subject
matter was an essential component of such general education." (emphasis added)).
484. Id.
485. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program against a religion-based constitutional challenge in
Jackson v. Benson." The program, designed to provide parental
choice and non-sectarian private school education for low-income
students in Milwaukee, was challenged under Wisconsin's version of
the Establishment Clause, known as the benefits clause." This clause
states, "[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.""
Under the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the State remitted
checks directly to the private school of the parents' choice.489 The
parents were then required to endorse these checks, payable to the
parents, to the school for their children's tuition." For each
participating student, the check was valued at the lesser of either the
state aid per student for a Milwaukee Public Schools education, or the
private school's actual educational cost per student.49 1 The court
dismissed the argument that this setup, involving a check payable to
parents, was merely a "sham" to circumvent the unconstitutionality of
direct payments to sectarian schools."' The court's explanation for
rejecting this licit argument was deflecting, obviating, and vacuous of
acute consideration: "In our assessment, the importance of our
inquiry here is not to ascertain the path upon which public funds travel
under the ... program, but rather to determine who ultimately
chooses that path.""' Because the design of the program made the
parents the ultimate choosers, the court found the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program constitutional.'
Relying on the primary-effects prong of the Lemon test, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the voucher program did not
violate the benefits clause.495 Specifically, the court found that the
sectarian schools received government funds only as a result of the
private independent choices of parents who opted to send their
486. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
487. Id. at 607, 610, 620.
488. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620.
489. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609, 618.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 609.
492. Id. at 618.
493. Id.
494. See id. at 618 (arguing that "not one cent flows from the State to a sectarian
private school under the [Milwaukee Parental Choice Program] except as a result of
the necessary and intervening choices of individual parents").
495. Id. at 620 (holding that the program "provides a neutral benefit directly to
children of economically disadvantaged families on a religious-neutral basis").
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children to the sectarian schools.9 The program also satisfied the
neutrality principle because the vouchers were generally available to
low-income families in Milwaukee who were selected randomly for
vouchers without regard to religion."' Moreover, with the exception
of sibling preferences, participating private schools were required to
randomly select students for admission irrespective of religion. 98
In addition to the benefits clause, the Milwaukee voucher program
was also challenged under the state's compelled support clause.
Wisconsin's compelled support clause states, "[N] or shall any person
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry, without consent. . . ."" The plaintiffs argued
that, under the voucher program, they were being forced to support
worship places."oo The court, however, found the element of
compulsion missing, as the program did not force any parent to
choose a sectarian school, any student to attend a sectarian school, or
any student to take part in religious activities."
Alabama's tax credit program was challenged as violating the
state's establishment clause in Magee v. Boyd.5" The clause states,
That no religion shall be established by law ... that no one shall be
compelled by law to attend any place of worship; nor to pay any
tithes, taxes, or other rate for building or repairing any place of
worship, or for maintaining any minister or ministry.o3
The tax credit program, enacted in the Alabama Accountability
Act, was comprised of two different forms of tax credit. 504 The first
took the form of tax credits for parents of students attending failing
public schools, allowing them to send their children to nonfailing
public schools or private schools.0 5 The tax credit was set at "80
percent of the 'average annual state cost of attendance' for a public
K-12 student during the relevant tax year or the actual cost of
attending a nonfailing public school or nonpublic school, whichever
is less." 5  If the parent's total tax credit exceeded the parent's
496. Id. at 618, 620-21.
497. Id. at 617-18, 620-21.
498. Id. at 617.
499. Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18;jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 622.
500. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620.
501. Id. at 623.
502. 175 So. 3d 79, 137 (Ala. 2015).
503. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
504. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 90.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 119 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-6D-8(a) (1) (2013) (abrogated by the Magee
court)).
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income tax liability, the State paid the parent-as a rebate-the tax
credit amount in excess of the tax liability.5 0' These tax credit rebates
were designed to be funded by the Education Trust Fund, which held
state sales tax revenues designated for public education.0 The
second form of tax credits was for individual and corporate donations
to scholarship-granting organizations (SGOs) that provided
scholarships to students from failing public schools-as well as low-
income students from nonfailing public schools-to attend
nonfailing public schools or private schools.50o
The plaintiffs claimed that the tax credits channeled government
funds to sectarian schools, forcing taxpayers to pay "taxes, or other rate
for building or repairing any place of worship, or for maintaining any
minister or ministry" in violation of the state's establishment clause.1 o
The Supreme Court of Alabama adopted the Lemon test for the state's
establishment clause because it viewed the state provision as a
"counterpart" to the federal Establishment Clause.'
The court's analysis centered on the primary-effects prong of the
Lemon test, which involved the application of the neutrality and
private-choice principles.5 1' Because the tax credits were neutrally
available to recipients without regard to religion, the program
satisfied the neutrality principle.5 1' The program also satisfied the
private-choice principle because sectarian schools only received funds
because of parents' independent private choices. 51 1 As a result, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' establishment clause challenge for
failure to state a claim, declaring that "the State's interest in
authorizing the tax credits in this case was not building or repairing
places of worship or maintaining ministers and ministries."5 1 5
The plaintiffs also challenged the tax credit under Alabama's no
aid clause, which states that "[n]o money raised for the support of
the public schools shall be appropriated to or used for the support of
any sectarian or denominational school."5 1 ' They claimed that the
program unconstitutionally diverted public school funds from the
507. Id. at 119.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 90, 120.
510. Id. at 137 (quoting ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3).
511. Id. at 137-38.
512. Id. at 138.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 131 (quoting ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263).
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Education Trust Fund to sectarian schools." The plaintiffs further
alleged that the program was unconstitutional because fifty-three of the
fifty-six private schools for which parents could claim the tax credits were
sectarian.1  The Supreme Court of Alabama rejected both arguments
based on federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Just as it did in its analysis under the state's establishment clause,
the court found that the program satisfied the private-choice
principle as well as the neutrality principle.' The court found that
any incentives in the program were not "deliberately skewed" toward
religion, and parents made independent choices about schools for
their children as part of a facially religion-neutral program.52 ' The
court also ruled that the amount of aid provided to sectarian schools
via tax credits to parents, as well as the number of sectarian schools
incidentally benefitting from that aid, is constitutionally insignificant
because the neutrality and private-choice principles are satisfied.2
Finally, the court ruled that tax credits do not constitute government
expenditures because tax credits involve private citizens' money
rather than government treasury money.' Accordingly, the tax
credits did not constitute an appropriation under the no aid clause,
making the no aid clause wholly inapplicable.2
B. Non-Religion-Based Challenges
This subsection of the Article reviews non-religion challenges based
on state constitutional grounds, such as efficiency, uniformity, public
purpose, new debt, anti-gift, and both state and local control provisions.
1. Efficiency
Some states have education clauses guaranteeing that the State will
provide a thorough and efficient education for its students.
Opponents of state programs benefitting private schools have
517. Id. at 131, 135.
518. Id. at 131.
519. Id. at 132-35 (relying extensively on the Supreme Court's decision in
Zelman); see also supra Section II.B.2 (discussing Establishment Clause Challenges in
the Supreme Court and accompanying discussion of Zelman).
520. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 132-35.
521. Id. at 135.
522. Id. (noting that the program had more than one secular purpose such as the
provision of educational options for students from failing schools and increased
accountability for public schools).
523. Id.; see also supra Part II (discussing how the court's rationale was heavily
influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Winn).
524. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 135-37.
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sometimes looked to these thorough-and-efficient provisions in
seeking to invalidate such programs. For instance, in Simmons-Haris
v. Goff the Cleveland voucher program that the United States
Supreme Court upheld in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris155 was challenged
in state court as violating the state's thorough-and-efficient provision,
which provides that "[t]he general assembly shall make such
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from
the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the State."52
The court summarily ruled that the Cleveland voucher program
did not violate the thorough-and-efficient provision because the
amount of government funding invested in the program did not
compromise the State's ability to fulfill its constitutional duty to
provide public education.5 2' This clearly suggests that if the plaintiffs
could provide data showing that continued funding of the voucher
program would jeopardize the State's ability to fund public
education, the court would have found the program
unconstitutional. The court further noted that, even though the
education clause requires the State to provide "a thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the State, "521 this
provision does not exclude government funding of private schools as
long as funding of public education is not imperiled.5 "
2. Uniformity
Some state constitutions have uniformity provisions that have
served as petitioners' basis for constitutional challenges to
government aid programs. These provisions generally require states
to provide a uniform system of education to its citizens. Florida's
uniformity provision, for instance, provides that the State has a
"paramount duty" to ensure adequate provision of education for all
students in the state;" and the adequate provision must be
accomplished through "a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
525. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher program under the Establishment Clause).
526. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999) (quoting OHIO
CONsT. art. VI, § 2).
527. Id. at 212.
528. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
529. Goff 711 N.E.2d at 212.
530. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006) (quoting FLA. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 1(a)).
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quality system of free public schools" that allows students to obtain a
high quality education.3
Florida's voucher program-the Opportunity Scholarship
Program-was challenged under this uniformity provision in Bush v.
Holmes.13 2  The program entitled students in struggling schools to
state treasury funds for private school education-funds that would
otherwise be allotted to the local school district for that student. 3 3
The program required parents to endorse the vouchers, made
payable to a parent, to the private school. 3"
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the uniformity provision
obligated the State to fulfill its responsibility by providing adequate
education through a "system of free public schools." 35  Therefore,
any attempt to fulfill this obligation outside of the public school
system would violate the uniformity provision.3 Because the voucher
program diverted funds, otherwise allotted to public schools, to
private school education, it was unconstitutional."' Additionally, the
voucher program did not include any measure to ensure that schools
benefiting from the program would be part of a uniform system of
public schools, as evidenced by the State's lack of oversight over
private schools. 3' For instance, the private schools were neither
regulated, nor subject to state-accreditation requirements, nor did
they have to follow the same curriculum and teacher certification
531. Id. at 405.
532. 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). The vouchers are also sometimes simply referred
to as opportunity scholarships. Id. at 400. The program also allowed sectarian
schools to participate in the voucher program, though that was not at issue in this
case. Id.
533. Id. at 397, 400.
534. Id. at 402.
535. Id. at 407-08.
536. Id. The court also rejected the State's contention that the requirement of
adequate education through the public school system merely set a minimum
requirement that allows the State to meet its obligation through other means such as
private education. The court explained that the uniformity provision instead
provides the public school system as the only means for the State to fulfill its
obligation. Id. at 408-09.
537. Id. at 408-09, 412. The court added that, in some cases, "the tuition paid to
the private school is less than the amount transferred [by the State] from the school
district's funds and therefore does not result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction" is
immaterial to "the constitutionality of public funding of private schools as a means to
making adequate provision for the education of children." Id. at 409; see also id.
("The systematic diversion of public funds to private schools on either a small or
large scale is incompatible with article IX, section 1(a) [of the Florida
Constitution].").
538. Id. at 409.
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standards as public schools.5 3 ' Finally, the court supported its
uniformity provision ruling with the constitution's state school fund
provision, which provides that "income derived from the state school
fund shall, and the principal of the fund may, be appropriated, but
only to the support and maintenance of free public schools."5 ' The
court interpreted both constitutional provisions in pari materia,
concluding that the voucher program unconstitutionally
appropriated state funds in support of private school education.
Wisconsin also has a uniformity provision that formed the basis of a
petitioner's challenge to the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in
Davis v. Grover.542 The voucher program's funding of private school
education was less than 40% of the cost to educate a student in a
Milwaukee Public School." Unlike Florida's voucher program, the
Milwaukee program included auditing as well as accountability and
reporting requirements relating to student issues such as
achievement, attendance, discipline, and parental involvement for
participating schools. 544 There was, however, no restriction on the
private schools' use of voucher funds as long as they satisfied basic
state law requirements for private school education.
The court's interpretation of Wisconsin's uniformity provision,
which was inapplicable to the voucher program at issue, gave much
deference to the legislature. Wisconsin's uniformity provision states,
"The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable."4 Because
private schools do not constitute district schools, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin ruled that the uniformity provision was inapplicable to
539. Id. at 409-10.
540. Id. at 399 n.1 (quoting FIA. CONST. art. IX, § 6).
541. Id.at410-11.
542. 480 N.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Wis. 1992); see also supra Section II.D (discussing
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
543. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 463. The value of the voucher was set at $2,500 per
student while the cost of public education per student in the Milwaukee Public
Schools was $6,451. Id. at 476-77. The number of students that could participate in
the program was capped at 1% of the total student enrollment in Milwaukee Public
Schools. Id. at 464, 471.
544. Id. at 463, 464. Further, the court stated that the program was an experiment
on alternative educational options that could have statewide and nationwide
implications for how to address academic achievement problems of students from
low-income families. Id. at 462-63, 470-72.
545. Id. at 475 ("It simply does not matter how the school spends the money so
long as it gives the participating student an education that complies with sec.
118.165, Stats., in return for the money.").
546. Id. at 473 (quoting WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3).
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the voucher program. 1 7  Conjointly, the mere fact that private
schools received public funds under the voucher program did not
make them district schools.' The court explained that the state's
uniformity provision only required of the legislature a minimum duty
to offer district schools that are as instructionally uniform as
possible."' Beyond that minimal duty, the legislature has authority to
provide expanded educational opportunities for students through
such means as vouchers.5 o
Likewise, in Jackson, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found in
favor of the voucher program being used for private education after a
challenge based on Wisconsin's uniformity provision.' Plaintiffs
argued that participating private schools effectively constituted
district schools under the uniformity provision because the voucher
program did not prevent the schools from being wholly funded by
public funds.5 5' The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however,
disagreed, ruling that the "mere appropriation of public monies to a
private school does not transform that school into a district school,"
irrespective of the amount.5 5 3 The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the uniformity provision made public schools the
exclusive recipients of school tax funding.
According to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the uniformity
provision's definition of district schools required that, at minimum,
the State must create district schools.5 Indeed, the uniformity
provision did not in any way prevent the State from doing more than
the minimum. 5 " The uniformity provision only required a "uniform
character of education" within the public school system,"' and, as the
court observed, the voucher program did not prevent students from
547. Id. at 473-74.
548. Id. at 474 ("In no case have we held that the mere appropriation of public
monies to a private school transforms that school into a public school. We decline
the opportunity to adopt such a conclusion here.").
549. Id. at 473.
550. Id.
551. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 627 (1998); see also supra Part III
(discussing religion-based challenges).
552. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 627.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 627-28 (citing Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3).
556. Id. at 628 ("The State's experimental attempts to improve upon that
foundation in no way deny any student the opportunity to receive the basic
education in the public school system.").
557. Id.
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attending a public school with a uniform character of education-it
simply offered alternatives.
The Cleveland voucher program was also challenged in Goff under
the state's uniformity provision, which provides that "[a]ll laws, of a
general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the
State."5 5 1 First, in determining the uniformity provision's
applicability, the court ruled that the nature of the voucher law was
general, rather than special, because it dealt with education, which
affects every part of the state." Second, the court considered
whether the voucher law applied uniformly statewide.5"' This
uniformity requirement did not mean that the law must impact
everyone in the state; instead, the law would be "valid if it contains
provisions which permit it to operate upon every locality where
certain specified conditions prevail" as long as the localities are not
arbitrarily determined.6
While the voucher program only operated in Cleveland, the language
of the voucher program specifically qualified any district under federal-
court-ordered state supervision.6 This opened the door for other
districts to become eligible for the program in the future.' 4 Furthermore,
the law did not aitrafily restrict the program to the Cleveland City School
District5 5 Instead, the program was implemented as a pilot program in
the state's largest district, which was in immense distress and, thus, under
federal order of state oversight,566 to experiment with possibilities for
addressing similar crisis situations.
558. Id.
559. Simmons-Harrisv. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999) (quoting OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 26); see also supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the Cleveland voucher program).
560. Goff 711 N.E.2d at 213.
561. Id.
562. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell, 142 N.E. 401 (Ohio 1924)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Localities will be deemed arbitrarily
determined if they are based on "artificial distinctions where no real distinction
exists." Id. (quoting Powell, 142 N.E. at 401).
563. Id. at 213-14.
564. Id. at 213 ("This court has also stated that 'a statute is deemed to be uniform
despite applying to only one case so long as its terms are uniform and it may apply to
cases similarly situated in the future."' (quoting State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568
N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (Ohio 1991))).
565. Id. at 214.
566. This federal order required the state superintendent of public instruction to
supervise and manage the operations of the district given its distress. Id. at 213.
567. Id.
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North Carolina's voucher program, the Opportunity Scholarship
Program, was challenged in Hart v. State based on the state's
uniformity provision, which states that "[t] he General Assembly shall
provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system
of free public schools."' The voucher program, funded by general
revenues, provided up to $4,200 per student for a limited number of
low-income students to attend private schools in order to combat the
grade-level nonproficiency epidemic among that student
demographic.7 o After the parents selected a school, the State sent
the check directly to the school with the proviso that the parents
exclusively endorse the check to the school for payment."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the plaintiffs'
characterization of the voucher program as one of government-
funded private schools because the program simply provided
scholarships to low-income students for use at the nonpublic school
of their choice.' The court suggested that, to the contrary, the
voucher program merely empowered lower-income parents, and
supported their private school choices through "modest" state
contributions."' Also, as the court noted, the uniformity provision
does not apply to private schools, as that provision only governs
schools within the public school system.7
Indiana's voucher program was challenged in Meredith under the
uniformity provision in the education clause of the Indiana
Constitution, which provides,7
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to
encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and
568. 774 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2015).
569. Id. at 289 (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2).
570. Id. at 285, 286. $10,800,000 was appropriated for the voucher program in the
2014-15 fiscal year. Id. at 286.
571. Id. at 286. The program imposed a variety of obligations on participating
private schools for each voucher student in order to ensure accountability, tuition
charge documentation and reports to the State, yearly academic progress reports for
parents; graduation rate reports to the State, no additional fee charge simply because
the student also got voucher payments, and financial review by a certified public
accountant in any year the school received voucher payments in excess of $300,000.
Criminal background checks were also required for the school's topmost official. Id.
572. Id. at 289.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 290.
575. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1220 (Ind. 2013); see also supra notes
469-85 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana's voucher program).
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agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and
uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be
without charge, and equally open to all. 7
Like the plaintiffs in Hart, the plaintiffs in Meredith claimed that the
Indiana voucher program unconstitutionally funded an educational
system outside of the uniform system of public schools.7
The Supreme Court of Indiana disagreed with this argument
because the education clause imposed two distinct duties on the state:
(1) the duty to encourage education "by all suitable means" and (2)
the duty to provide a uniform public school system.7 According to
the court, the word "and" separating both duties within the education
clause made the duties distinct from each other.5 7 ' As distinct duties,
the State could, therefore, provide a uniform public school system and
still support education through such means as the voucher program.so
The court also dismissed the argument that, because the voucher
program could cause the public school system to lose up to 60% of its
students, the State had abandoned its duty to provide a uniform
system of public schools. 58 ' Specifically, the court found no evidence
in the record that "maximum participation in the voucher program
[would] necessarily result in the elimination of the Indiana public
school system."5" Further, the court ruled that as long as the State
provided a free and uniform public school system that all students
were equally eligible to participate in, the State's obligation under
the uniformity provision was fulfilled.
3. Public purpose
Plaintiffs often challenge government aid programs under the
public purpose doctrine, which requires that government funds be
used only for public purposes.58 4 The Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program was challenged in Davis under the public purpose
doctrine.8 Although the Wisconsin Constitution does not contain a
provision embodying the public purpose doctrine, the Supreme
576. Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1221 (quoting IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1).
577. Id. at 1220.
578. Id. at 1220-21 (citing IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1).
579. Id.
580. Id. at 1222, 1224-25.
581. Id. at 1222-23.
582. Id. at 1223.
583. Id.
584. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992).
585. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Davis, see supra Section III.B.2.
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Court of Wisconsin has long recognized the doctrine.5 " The Davis
court emphasized that, in the absence of a clear constitutional
violation, the judiciary must defer to the legislature, which is more
directly accountable to the electorate and representative of the
public.5 " Nevertheless, programs that provide government funding
for private school education violate the public purpose doctrine if
private schools are not subject to reasonable accountability regulation
designed to ensure the funds are used in the public interest." The
Davis court acknowledged that the Milwaukee voucher program did
not restrict private schools' use of voucher funds as long as those
schools provide basic education in accordance with state law.589 Yet,
the court concluded that the basic-education requirement was a
sufficiently reasonable regulation because the State held public
schools similarly accountable for some allotted government funds.5"
The voucher program in Davis further fulfilled a public purpose
because it included various legislative supervision and control
measures.59 1  It provided for financial and performance audits of
participating private schools as well as various reporting requirements
to ensure reasonable state supervision of government funds in the
public interest.'" The court also ruled that parental choice within
the program constituted sufficient reasonable accountability, thus
satisfying the public purpose doctrine. 593 This was because, under the
program, parents had the freewill to leave underperforming schools,
opting instead for better-performing schools.5 " The court also
concluded that the insignificant cost of the voucher program relative
to the cost of Milwaukee's public school education provided another
reasonable state accountability regulation that controlled program
spending.9 In particular, the court found the $2.5 million cost of
the voucher program insignificant relative to the $6.4 billion cost of
educating students in the Milwaukee Public Schools. 5 9 6
586. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d
790 (Wis. 1969)).
587. Id. at 474-75.
588. Id. at 475.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 476.
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 476-77.
596. Id. at 477. The court minimized this significant amount by using a
proportionality argument: "The amount of money to fund the [Milwaukee Parental
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This voucher program was likewise challenged based on the public
purpose doctrine in Jackson v. Benson.5" In Jackson, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin ruled that courts must find a public purpose unless it is
"clear and palpable" that the government expenditure serves no public
end.5 11 Withal, the court reaffirmed that the doctrine mandates private
schools receiving public funds be subject to reasonable accountability
and control regulations to ensure the funds use for public ends.5 9 Not
only did the court find a public purpose for the voucher spending-
education-it also found that private schools participating in the
voucher program were subject to reasonable accountability
regulations. These regulations included state curriculum and
instruction and attendance regulations governing the state's private
schools, yearly financial audits of voucher schools, and the parental
right to choose more accountable schools for their children."' The
court deemed these regulations sufficient because private schools
receiving government funds do not have to be "controlled as two-
fistedly as a government agency ... [and] should not bog down
private agencies with unnecessary government control.""
Illinois' tax credit program was challenged in Toney v. Bower under
the state constitution's public purpose provision, which provides that
"[p]ublic funds, property or credit shall be used only for public
purposes."" The Illinois appellate court ruled that the same secular
purposes that satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test constituted
satisfactory public purposes under the public purpose provision.6 0
Choice Program] represents only about four one-hundredths of one percent (.04
percent) of the public money allocated for public education throughout the state." Id.
597. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin iterated that,
under this doctrine, public funds will only be expended constitutionally if they are
used exclusively for public purposes. Id. at 628. For a more detailed discussion of
Jackson, see supra Section III.A.
598. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 628 (citing State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La
Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 798 (Wis. 1973)).
599. Id. at 629.
600. Id. at 628-29.
601. Id. at 629-30.
602. Id. at 629 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Wis.
1969)). The court also rejected the argument that the public purpose doctrine
precluded government funding for sectarian schools, noting that it had "never
interpreted the public purpose doctrine to incorporate an anti-establishment
principle." Id. at 630.
603. Toney v. Bower, 744 N.E.2d 351, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting ILL. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1(a)). For a more detailed discussion of Toney, see supra Section III.A.
604. Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 363 ("By creating the Credit, the legislature has
recognized that parents who send their children to private schools often do so at
considerable expense to themselves and that they provide a benefit to the State
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The court further recognized that the tax credits fulfilled a public
purpose by facilitating adequate education for all students."
North Carolina's voucher program was challenged in Hart under
the state constitution's public purpose doctrine."' The doctrine is
represented in two state constitutional provisions:17  (1) article V,
section 2(1), which provides, "The power of taxation shall be
exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only,
and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away,""
and (2) article V, section 2(7), which provides, "The General
Assembly may enact laws whereby the State, any county, city or town,
and any other public corporation may contract with and appropriate
money to any person, association, or corporation for the
accomplishment of public purposes only."' According to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, the crucial determinant of
whether a program fulfills a public purpose is whether the State
intended the appropriation to benefit the public."'o
The Hart court found that the funding allotted to the challenged
Opportunity Scholarship Program accomplished a public purpose.'
Under North Carolina's public purpose doctrine, an appropriation of
tax revenue must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) it must be reasonably
connected to a state necessity or convenience and (2) it must benefit
the general public, rather than special interests, though it does not
have to benefit every citizen.' The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, nonetheless, declared that "public purpose" must be
broadly construed.' Based on a broad construction, the court found
treasury by relieving the State and local taxpayers of the expense of educating their
children."). For a more detailed discussion of Toney, see supra notes 418-29 and
accompanying text. For an illustration of the secular purposes prong of the Lemon
test, see supra Section III.A.
605. Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 363.
606. Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281, 290 (N.C. 2015). For a more detailed
discussion of Hart, see supra Section III.B.2.
607. See Hart, 774 S.E.2d at 290 ("Because the power to appropriate money from
the public treasury is no greater than the power to levy the tax which put the money
in the treasury, we subject both legislative powers to the public purpose
requirement." (emphasis omitted) (citing Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159
S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (N.C. 1968))).
608. Id. at 290 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1)).
609. Id. (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(7)).
610. Id.
611. Id. at 291.
612. Id. at 291-92.
613. Cf id. at 291 (stating that the term "public purpose" should not be narrowly
construed, and providing examples of its broad application).
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that the state's voucher program satisfied the first prong because the
program was reasonably connected to education-a necessity for the
state's citizens.6' The program also satisfied the second public-
purpose prong because, even though individuals benefitted from the
vouchers, it did not negate the benefit and purpose the general
public ultimately attained from vouchers. 15 Additionally, the court
ruled that the State has the right to create a "laboratory of
democracy" through a voucher program and to "experiment with
new modes of dealing with old evils."1 1 6
4. Local control
Some states regulate the use of government aid through
constitutional provisions that require local school districts to control
education. The Supreme Court of Colorado confronted such a
provision in Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers and Students,"'
when the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Colorado
Opportunity Contract Pilot Program under the state's local control
provision." This program entitled parents of low-income and low-
achieving students enrolled in private schools to enter into contracts
with their local school districts for checks payable to the parents for the
private education.' The parents were then required to endorse the
checks over to the private school for the school's exclusive use.'
The Colorado local control provision requires qualified electors in
each district to elect school board directors who "shall have control of
instruction in the public schools of their respective districts."" The
Supreme Court of Colorado pointed out that this provision was
adopted by Colorado's constitutional convention delegates out of
fear of politicizing education; fear founded in great distrust of state
power undermining the local citizenry's voice.' The court thus
interpreted the local control provision to mean that control of
instruction paid for by local funds must always be vested in the local
school district.' The court reasoned further that, despite the
614. Id. at 291-92.
615. Id. at 292. The vouchers ultimately inured to the general public's benefit and
for the recognized public purpose of educating the citizenry.
616. Id. at 294.
617. 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004) (en banc).
618. Id. at 936.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 15.
622. Owens, 92 P.3d at 938-39, 941 n.8.
623. Id. at 935 (citing Belier v. Wilson, 147 P. 355 (Colo. 1915) (en banc)).
1418 [Vol. 65:1335
SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND TAx BENEFITS
provision saying nothing about controlling local funds, local school
districts must control instruction with local funds."
This local control over local funds trumps the legislature's power to
direct education policy.6 2' For these reasons, the court found the
Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program, which relied on local
funds, unconstitutional under the local control provision. 66 The
program took away local district control over (1) the amount of local
funds expended on private schools, (2) instruction at the private
schools supported by the local funds, and (3) which schools and
students could participate in the program. 2 1 In all, local control over
local funds and local instruction is essential because "local taxation
has traditionally been the means by which taxpayers in the individual
districts participate in the management of public school
education." 2 1 Voucher programs that require local funding would
clearly violate this principle in states with local control provisions.
5. State control
Some states, such as Virginia, have a constitutional provision that
restricts public funds to schools under state control. Virginia's
control provision states, "No appropriation of public funds shall be
made to any school or institution of learning not owned or
exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision
thereof .... "629 This provision was designed to protect funding for,
624. Id. at 935, 939, 941, 943 (citing Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005, 1022 (Colo. 1982) (en banc)).
625. See id. at 940 ("[T]he local control provision of section 15 protects school
districts against legislative efforts to require them to spend locally-raised funds on
instruction that the district does not control, and preserves the districts' democratic
framework."). The court rejected the argument that "with greater state funding
comes greater state control over educational policy," explaining that "[t]his Court
has long recognized ... that the constitutional division of power between the state
and local boards is not measured by funding." Id. at 943.
626. Id. at 942-44.
627. Id. at 942-43. The parents chose the schools and then the district was required
to make four payments that the parents could use toward their children's education.
628. Id. at 941 (citing Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1021).
629. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10; Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851, 854 (Va. 1955). In full,
the constitutional provision states:
No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any school or institution
of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political
subdivision thereof; provided, first, that the General Assembly may, and the
governing bodies of the several counties, cities and towns may, subject to
such limitations as may be imposed by the General Assembly, appropriate
funds for educational purposes which may be expended in furtherance of
elementary, secondary, collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students
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and the continuing viability of, the state's public school system.6so In
Almond v. Day,"' the provision formed the basis of a constitutional
challenge to state funding for the private school education of
children of deceased or disabled veterans of World Wars I and II.6'
In that case, the Virginia attorney general filed suit for mandamus
after the comptroller, believing voucher payments violated the state
control provision, refused payments. 33
Even though the voucher payments were made to parents, rather than
directly to the school, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the
vouchers were unconstitutional appropriations because the state control
provision did not distinguish between direct and indirect payments.634
The state provision barred any and all appropriations, which the court
defined as the earmarking of funds irrespective of whether the funds
went directly to the school.13' The court observed that appropriations
are not often directed to the beneficiary, but rather designated for
particular purposes, which in this case benefitted the school. 36
The court ruled that the beneficiary of aid must be determined by
examining its "natural and reasonable effect"; in this case, the effect
was support of private school education with parents simply serving as
conduits for the aid. 3' The court observed that the voucher program's
tuition payments were different from other government programs that
provide textbooks or student transportation:6 8  while schools might
not directly benefit from textbooks or transportation, tuition is the
in public and nonsectarian private schools and institutions of learning, in
addition to those owned or exclusively controlled by the State or any such
county, city or town; second, that the General Assembly may appropriate
funds to an agency, or to a school or institution of learning owned or
controlled by an agency, created and established by two or more States
under a joint agreement to which this State is a party for the purpose of
providing educational facilities for the citizens of the several States joining in
such agreement; third, that counties, cities, towns, and districts may make
appropriations to nonsectarian schools of manual, industrial, or technical
training, and also to any school or institution of learning owned or
exclusively controlled by such county, city, town, or school district.
VA CONST. art. 8, § 10.
630. Alnwnd, 89 S.E.2d at 855.
631. 89 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1955).
632. Id. at 853--54.
633. Id. at 852.
634. Id. at 855-56, 858-59.
635. Id. at 855-56.
636. Id. at 856.
637. Id. at 857.
638. Id.
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"very life blood" of schools.' As such, vouchers benefit participating
private schools-schools not exclusively owned or controlled by the
State-consequently violating the Virginia state control provision.640
Private school voucher programs in North Carolina have also been
challenged. The plaintiffs in Hart challenged the North Carolina
voucher program, arguing that public funds should only be
expended for schools under the state's exclusive control-i.e., the
public school system."' The state school fund provision the plaintiffs
relied on provides that
[t]he proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be
granted by the United States to this State, and not otherwise
appropriated by this State or the United States; all moneys, stocks,
bonds, and other property belonging to the State for purposes of
public education; the net proceeds of all sales of the swamp lands
belonging to the State; and all other grants, gifts, and devises that
have been or hereafter may be made to the State, and not otherwise
appropriated by the State or by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise,
shall be paid into the State Treasury and, together with so much of
the revenue of the State as may be set apart for that purpose, shall be
faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for establishing and
maintaining a uniform system of free public schools.642
The Supreme Court of North Carolina dismissed the plaintiffs'
argument, reasoning that the constitutional provision was not
intended to restrict the State's ability to spend on education, but
rather to protect funding for public schools."' In essence, as long as
the state's public school funding is protected, the State can spend
funds on non-public school education."
As the court noted, the state control provision specified four non-
revenue school funding sources-two mandatory and two
discretionary-from the state treasury for education.' The fifth
639. Id. at 856-57.
640. Id. at 854, 857, 859.
641. Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281, 288 (N.C. 2015). For a more detailed
discussion of Hart, see supra notes 570-74.
642. Hart, 774 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 6).
643. Id. at 288-90.
644. Id.
645. The two discretionary non-revenue parts of the constitutional provision are (1)
"The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United
States to this State, and not otherwise appropriated by this State or the United States"; and (2)
"and all other grants, gifts, and devises that have been or hereafter may be made to the
State, and not otherwise appropriated by the State or by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise."
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (emphasis added). The two mandatory non-revenue parts of
the constitutional provision are (1) "all moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property
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funding source is the revenue clause, which states: "together with so
much of the revenue of the State as may be set apart for that purpose
[public education] ."64' The court observed that the word "may" gave
the State discretion on earmarking funds from the state revenue for
public education."' Although the North Carolina Constitution
required non-revenue sources to be used exclusively for public
education, the revenue clause did not preclude the State from using
some state revenue for non-public school education." Accordingly,
school beneficiaries of state revenue funding did not have to be
schools under state control.
Other courts have reached different conclusions based on state
constitutional provisions. For example, in Louisiana Federation of
Teachers v. Louisiana,"" the court upheld a state control provision
challenge to Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence, the
state's voucher program.6' The plaintiffs alleged that vouchers were
unconstitutionally funding schools outside of the public school
system.65' The plaintiffs relied on the constitutional provision which
states, in relevant part, that the State must
annually develop and adopt a formula which shall be used to
determine the cost of a minimum foundation program of
education in all public elementary and secondary schools as well as
to equitably allocate the funds to parish and city school
systems .... The legislature shall annually appropriate funds
sufficient to fully fund the current cost to the state of . .. a
minimum foundation program of education in all public
elementary and secondary schools, [and the] funds appropriated
shall be equitably allocated to parish and city school systems.6 5 3
belonging to the State for purposes of public education"; and (2) "the net proceeds of
allsales of the swamp lands belonging to the State." Id. (emphasis added).
646. Hart, 774 S.E.2d at 288 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 6).
647. Id. at 289.
648. Id.
649. Id. at 288-90 ("The framers of the 1868 Constitution sought to constitutionalize
the State's obligation to protect the State school fund. In so doing, our framers chose not
to limit the State from appropriating general revenue to fund alternative educational
initiatives. Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are without merit.").
650. 118 So. 3d 1033 (La. 2013).
651. Id. at 1037, 1039, 1071. The plaintiffs also challenged the Course Choice
Program, which provided funding for dual enrollment courses at private or public
schools. Id. at 1037-39, 1046. The Supreme Court of Louisiana found this program
unconstitutional for the same reasons it found the voucher program, discussed
below, unconstitutional. Id. at 1055.
652. Id. at 1039.
653. Id. at 1044, 1050 (quoting LA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 13(B)).
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The voucher program, funded through the minimum foundation
program, allowed students from low-performing public schools to
attend private schools or other public schools. The state
transferred to the private school the minimum foundation program
allocation that the student's local district would otherwise receive for
that student.655  While students could use the voucher at public
schools outside their local district, most of the schools eligible for the
voucher were private schools.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana found the voucher program
unconstitutional because it contravened the constitutional provision,
which explicitly limited the use of minimum foundation program
funds to "all public elementary and secondary schools" and obligated
the State to "equitably allocate the funds to parish and city school
systems." 5 ' Furthermore, rather than a conferral of power,
Louisiana's state control provision imposed a restriction on state
power.6 5" Thus, the State could not use minimum foundation
program funds for vouchers in support of private schools."
Additionally, the court rejected the State's argument that it could
use the minimum foundation program to fund vouchers once the
State exceeded a minimum obligation for public schools.' The
court instead ruled that, once the State implemented the minimum
foundation program, all funds under the program must be allocated
to public schools."' Nonetheless, the State tried to save the voucher
program by arguing that voucher recipients remained part of their
local school district and that, as a result, the voucher program simply
funded the education of public school students." Unsurprisingly,
the court repelled this argument because the students actually
attended private schools and voucher payments were made directly to
the private schools."
654. Id. at 1046.
655. Id. at 1037-38, 1047, 1049.
656. Id. at 1049 n.16.
657. Id. at 1049-52.
658. Id. at 1051.
659. Id. at 1054, 1071.
660. Id. at 1050.
661. See id. at 1054 ("Pursuant to Article VIII, § 13(B), whatever discretion existed
prior to the funds being dedicated to the MFP [minimum foundation program] is no
more; the state funds approved through the unique MFP process cannot be diverted
to nonpublic schools or other nonpublic course providers according to the clear,
specific, and unambiguous language of the constitution.").
662. Id.
663. Id. at 1055.
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Plaintiffs relied on state control in seeking to invalidate the
Alabama tax credit program in Magee, which offered tax credits for
students' private school education costs and for individual and
corporate donations to scholarship-granting organizations.' The
plaintiffs claimed that the tax credit program violated the state
control provision by appropriating the public school Education Trust
Fund to reimburse parents for tuition and fees at private schools,
which are not under absolute state control.
The state control provision states that
[n]o appropriation shall be made to any charitable or educational
institution not under the absolute control of the state, other than
normal schools established by law for the professional training of
teachers for the public schools of the state, except by a vote of two-
thirds of all the members elected to each house.6
The plaintiffs further contended that, because two-thirds of each
legislative house did not approve the use of the Education Trust Fund to
support private schools, the tax credit program was unconstitutional."
The Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the plaintiffs' contentions
because tax credits are not encompassed within time-honored
definitions of appropriations: the designation of a specific fund, or
specific part of money within the public treasury, or a specific part of
government revenue, for a specified object?5' Furthermore, because
the tax credits were paid to parents-rather than schools-the court
ruled that, under the express language of the state control provision, tax
credits were not "made to any charitable or educational institution."6 6 9
6. New debt clauses
Government aid programs can also be challenged under a state
constitution's new debt clause. Such was the case in Magee where
664. Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 120 (Ala. 2015). For further discussion on this
case, see supra notes 502-24 and accompanying text.
665. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 120. The plaintiffs also claimed that the tax credits for the
individual and corporate donations amounted to appropriations because they diverted
to private schools funds that would otherwise be allotted to public schools. Id.
666. AL. CONST. art. IV, § 73.
667. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 120.
668. Id. at 121-22 (citing Appropriation, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 93 (5th ed. 1979);
Toney v. Bower, 744 N.E.2d 351, 357-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); McAlpine v. Univ. of
Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 87 (Alaska 1988)).
669. AL. CONST. art. IV, § 73 (emphasis added); Magee, 175 So. 3d at 123-24
(stating that "no money is set aside or specified from the public revenue or treasury to
be applied to a charitable or educational institution"). The court ruled that, to regard
tax credits as appropriations, would be "contrary to the Alabama Constitution existing
case law and the commonly accepted definition of the term appropriation." Id. at 126.
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plaintiffs claimed that Alabama's tax credit program violated the new
debt clause, which provides that "[a]ny act creating or incurring any
new debt against the state, except as herein provided for, shall be
absolutely void.""'o The plaintiffs contended that the tax program
created a new state debt without providing a matching revenue
source funding the tax credit program."' They claimed that the tax
credit program imposed a new financial obligation on the State while
relying on existing sales taxes deposited in the Education Trust Fund
to fund those new obligations.7 Plaintiffs also argued that, because
the State failed to cap the total tax credits allowable as well as the
number of possible taxpayer beneficiaries under the program, the
program effectively ensured creation of new debt.'
The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled, however, that the tax credit
program did not create a new debt." As the court explained,
contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, the program authorized spending
"only the amount from sales tax revenues within the Education Trust
Fund that is sufficient for the Department of Revenue to use to cover
the income tax credits for the applicable tax year."' In other words, the
government funding of the tax credit program was not uncapped;
rather, it was based on the revenue commissioner's annual
calculation of that year's expected total tax credits.' In essence, the
program did not anticipate funding of the tax credit program once
the sales taxes deposited in the Education Trust Fund for the
program ran out.67 7
The court also ruled that, since a new debt under the new debt
clause only referred to unconditional debt, contingent debt did not
qualify as new debt.67 8 Inasmuch as the tax credit program only paid
parents from the Education Trust Fund when the parent's tax credit
amount exceeded tax liability, the program only created contingent
debt.' Further, the program design was- such that the amount of
670. ALA. CONsT. art. XI, § 213; Magee, 175 So. 3d at 128.
671. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 128.
672. Id. at 128-29.
673. Id.
674. Id. at 129.
675. AA. CODE § 16-6D-8(c) (2016) (emphasis added); Magee, 175 So. 3d at 129-30.
676. Magee, 175 So. 3d at 129-30.
677. See id. at 130 (stating that the program "neither makes nor contemplates an
obligation of the State further than such as is within the revenues levied and assessed,
and in process of collection for the current year or such as may have been already
collected for that year").
678. Id. at 130.
679. Id.
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each parent's tax credit was contingent: "[tihe income tax credit
shall be an amount equal to 80 percent of the average annual state
cost of attendance for a public K-12 student during the applicable
tax year or the actual cost of attending a nonfailing public school or
nonpublic school, whichever is less.""o Thus, by infusing the element
of contingency into the program design, the Alabama legislature
avoided violating the new debt clause.
7. Anti-gift clauses
Arizona has an anti-gift clause in its constitution, which bars the State
from "giv[ing] or loan[ing] its credit in the aid of, or mak[ing] any
donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association,
or corporation.""' While this clause does not expressly include a public
purpose provision, the Supreme Court of Arizona has recognized a
public purpose exception that allows the State to gift or donate to
individuals or private entities for public purposes if the recipient
provides sufficient consideration." In Kotterman, the Supreme Court of
Arizona ruled that a tax credit does not constitute a gift since the
government never owned the taxpayer money claimed as a tax credit."
This is very similar to the court's reasoning that tax credits do not
constitute appropriations because they never entered government
control." The court also indicated that the State had a valid public
purpose for tax credits similar to that of other states that pursue voucher
programs and charter schools: providing for educational choices
beyond the public school system in order to further student
achievement, and adjusting for dynamic societal and economic needs."
8. Non-religion funding/no aid clause
Various states have clauses in their constitutions that prohibit any
and all funding for any form of education other than public school
education. These clauses are sometimes similar to Blaine
Amendments, particularly those no aid clauses that mention sectarian
680. ALA. CODE § 16-6D-8 (a) (1) (emphasis added); Magee, 175 So. 3d at 129.
681. ApZ. CONST. art. 9 § 7; Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (1999) (en banc).
682. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 621.
683. Id. ("One cannot make a gift of something that one does not own."); see supra
notes 255-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Establishment Clause challenge
to Kotternman).
684. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 621; see also supra notes 375-96 (discussing the
challenges in Kotterman via two Arizona religion clauses).
685. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 623-24.
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schools." However, rather than targeting funding for sectarian
schools, these clauses are "primarily designed to protect the public
fisc and to protect public schools.""' Arizona's scholarship program
for students with disabilities, the Empowerment Scholarship Accounts
was challenged in Niehaus under the state's no aid clause which
provides that " [n] o tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money
made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any
public service corporation."" The Arizona court of appeals held that
the scholarship program did not violate the no aid clause because the
scholarships did not constitute an appropriation."89
The court ruled that three elements were critical to appropriations:
first, a certain monetary sum must be set aside from government
revenue; second, government officials must be authorized to spend
the money; and third, the money must be spent on an appropriate
"specified object."6 9 0  Because the scholarship program ostensibly
satisfied the first two elements, the court's analysis centered on the
third element. Much like with the religion clause analysis, the court
relied on the private-choice principle in identifying the actual
beneficiary of the scholarship program."" The court ruled that
parents, not schools, were the specified objects of the program, as the
program did not earmark funds for schools."' Instead, the State
maintained savings accounts for parents to withdraw program funds
for use at a multitude of schooling options, several of which were
private schools. 93 Parents could wholly avoid using the funds at
private schools by using them for educational therapy, tutoring,
public post-secondary education, and home-based instruction.
Accordingly, parents controlled and disbursed the withdrawn funds."
686. See supra notes 364-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Blaine
Amendments).
687. Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Cain
v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc)).
688. Aluz. CONsT. art. 9 § 10 (emphasis added); Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 987; see also
supra notes 398-408 and accompanying text (discussing Niehaus and religion-based
challenges).
689. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 987.
690. Id. (citing League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 201 P.3d 517, 521 (Ariz.
2009) (en banc)).
691. See supra notes 404-08 and accompanying text (analyzing the religion clause
private-choice principle within Niehaus).
692. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 987.
693. Id. at 988.
694. Id. at 987-88.
695. See id. at 988-89 ("This program enhances the ability of parents of disabled
children to choose how best to provide for their educations, whether in or out of
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Moreover, the no aid clause has never been construed to bar private
schools from receiving government funds; 96 the clause merely
prohibits earmarkingfunds to private schools."' For these reasons, the
court found that the program did not violate the no aid clause. 98
Arizona's no aid clause also formed the basis of the constitutional
challenge, in Cain v. Horne,6 " to two other government aid programs
that each allotted $2.5 million to send special populations of students
to private schools: the Arizona Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities
and the Displaced Pupils Grant Program.7 " The Arizona Scholarship
for Pupils with Disabilities provided scholarships, capped at the basic
state aid otherwise paid for the student's public school education, for
students with disabilities.70 ' The Displaced Pupils Grant Program
provided scholarships, capped at the lesser of $5,000 or tuition costs
and fees, for foster care children.70 2 Both voucher programs issued
checks to parents, who were obligated to specifically endorse them
over to the private schools.70 s
The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that the funding for each
voucher program constituted an appropriation of public funds
because the funds came out of the state treasury.o Furthermore,
because the no aid clause prohibited appropriating public funds to
private schools, the voucher programs were unconstitutional.o
Although parents were the initial recipients of the voucher check, they
were obligated to endorse the check to the private school.7" Thus, the
parents had no consequential and real control over the check; they
merely served as a channel for public funds to private schools.707
The court refused to apply the "true beneficiary theory," which holds
that individuals benefitting from the government aid are the actual
private schools. No funds in the ESA [Empowerment Scholarship Accounts] are
earmarked for private schools. Thus, we hold that the ESA does not violate the [no]
aid clause.").
696. Id. at 988.
697. Recall that the no aid clause provided that "[n]o tax shall be laid or
appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian
school, or any public service corporation." ARIz. CONST. art. 9 § 10.
698. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 988-89.
699. 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
700. Id. at 1180-81.
701. Id. at 1180.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 1180-81.
704. Id. at 1184.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. Id.
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beneficiaries even though the funding goes to the private schools.70 s As
the court observed, sanctioning the true beneficiary theory would make
the no aid clause meaningless: the theory would allow the State to
interminably divert public funds to private schools by simply claiming
that students are the actual beneficiaries." With no refuge in the true
beneficiary theory, the voucher programs were invalidated as
unconstitutional appropriations under the no aid clause.o
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This section discusses implications of the government aid
jurisprudence for legislation enacting vouchers and tax benefits for
education including ideas that legislation should incorporate to
endure constitutional challenges. Inextricably, these same ideas
should enlighten challengers of voucher and tax benefit programs
evaluating programs for constitutional objections.
As the Supreme Court has noted, there is an Establishment Clause
danger of political divisiveness in the religious arena when
government aid supports modern innovations:
[M]odern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and self-
expanding propensities. These internal pressures are only enhanced
when the schemes involve institutions whose legitimate needs are
growing and whose interests have substantial political support. Nor
can we fail to see that in constitutional adjudication some steps,
which when taken were thought to approach 'the verge,' have
become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum
develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill thrust'
easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop. Development by
momentum is not invariably bad; indeed, it is the way the common
law has grown, but it is a force to be recognized and reckoned with.
The dangers are increased by the difficulty of perceiving in advance
exactly where the 'verge' of the precipice lies. 71 1
Despite the dangers, the federal and state judiciaries have trended
toward upholding government funding of innovations in education,
such as vouchers and tax benefits. The critical factor for the courts
tends to be the program design: programs designed based on the
private-choice principle and the neutrality principle tend to survive
judicial scrutiny. Courts reason that if the program is designed as
708. Id. at 1183-84.
709. Id. at 1184. After all, any government aid to schools ineluctably benefits
students.
710. Id. at 1184-85.
711. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
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religiously neutral and empowers parents to choose schools, any benefit
to sectarian schools would be attenuated at best. This is so because the
private choice and neutrality principles serve as circuit breakers between
the government and the sectarian school, giving the parents ownership
of the sectarian school's receipt of government funds.
In order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, government aid
programs should include private schools, as well as non-local public
schools, among the options offered to parents; particularly because
some courts like to see public schools as one of the options to assure
neutrality. Further, issues of program neutrality arise even if a state
constitution does not preclude sectarian school participation in a
voucher and tax credit program. Programs must still be designed to
avoid favoring sectarian schools both generally and specifically.
Programmatically, voucher programs should be designed such that
the checks are either given to the parents-with restrictive
endorsement to the parents' chosen school-or sent to the school in
the parents' name-with the law requiring the parents to then
restrictively endorse the checks over to the school. Either of these
designs would satisfy the private-choice principle. If the check is sent
to the school and in the school's name the program would most
certainly violate the private-choice principle.
The value of the voucher or tax benefit should also be either the
actual cost of the private school's tuition, or less than the cost of tuition,
so that sectarian schools do not actually reap a bonus from the program;
and, so that parents are not incentivized to choose sectarian schools
because of the possibility of the extra benefit beyond the actual tuition
cost. Regardless, a government aid program must not build in a
financial incentive designed to influence parents to choose sectarian
schools, otherwise the program would violate the private-choice
principle by making the parental choice not truly independent. Where
the voucher amount exceeds the sectarian school's actual tuition costs,
the sectarian school might end up being able to use the extra funds for
sectarian purposes, unless the program design explicitly dictates that
all extra funds must be exclusively used for secular purposes.
Despite the fascination of the Supreme Court and various state
courts with the private-choice principle, it is noteworthy that some
courts reject the idea that the private-choice principle severs the
constitutional violation in government funding of sectarian schools.
The Supreme Court of Alaska, for instance, has ruled that the private-
choice principle does not create a "cleansing effect and somehow
cause the funds to lose their identity as public funds. While the
ingenuity of man is apparently limitless, the Court has held with
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unvarying regularity that one may not do by indirection what is
forbidden directly." 1 2  At heart, the private-choice principle is an
artificial judicial construct created to escape the constitutional
constraints against government funding of sectarian schools.
Therewith, the school choice/government aid jurisprudence generally
portends that if program design remits aid directly to sectarian schools
without allowing for private choice, or defines recipients of the aid by
reference to religion, the program would conventionally violate state
religion clauses and the federal Establishment Clause. The program
design must not "sell the people ... a mule and call it a horse, even if
[they] believe the public needs a mule."713
In tempering the constitutional protections within the federal and
state constitutions, courts should soberly heed the following
monitorial that could upend the potential for divisiveness in
education: "[w]e make no distinction between a small violation of
the Constitution and a large one. Both are equally invalid. Indeed, in
the system of government envisioned by the Founding Fathers, we
abhor the small violation precisely because it is precedent for the
larger one."' Michigan voters recognized this and approved a
constitutional amendment that counters the tempering of
constitutional protections; this amendment explicitly excludes
funding for vouchers and tax benefits, proactively omitting them
from the arena of interminable political divisiveness over religion.
Specifically, the Michigan Constitution provides that
712. Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1979) (citing
Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 415 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd mem., 409 U.S. 808
(1972), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975)).
713. Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1983).
714. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006). An example of political
divisiveness along religious lines contemporaneous with the enactment of some no
aid clauses can be seen in the following excerpt:
In 1844, there were riots in Philadelphia and elsewhere as Protestants and
Roman Catholics battled in the streets. This conflict reflected issues such as
class, economic status and ethnic differences-but one of the issues was
whether the Roman Catholic or Protestant version of the Bible should be
used in public schools. Catholic leaders desperately wanted public funding
for their school system; Protestants wanted the same, but didn't want this
government largesse to benefit the Catholics. The status of religion in the
public square was fiercely debated throughout the 19th century....
Different religious groups proclaimed that their particular religion should
be the law of the land; in some cases, this took the form of attempts to enact
a constitutional amendment declaring that America was a 'Christian nation.'
Johnson, supra note 368, at 23-24.
715. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; see Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 ("Ordinarily political
debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
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No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition
voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall
be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any
student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic
school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered
in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students.716
Furthermore, some states regulate vouchers and tax benefits.
through no aid clauses that do not explicitly mention vouchers and tax
benefits but prohibit all aid-whether direct or indirect-to sectarian
schools and in some cases to all private schools. In order to prevent
violations in states where the religion clause or the no aid clause
prohibits funding of sectarian schools, instruction, or purposes, the
program design can avoid constitutional infirmity by excluding
sectarian schools as participants. For, as K Hollman, General Counsel
for Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, pointed out, "The
prohibition on government aid for religion has protected against the
corrupting influence of government money on religious bodies and
served the interest of government neutrality toward religion."7 1 7
In states where the courts' interpretation of the state's religion
clause track that of the federal Establishment Clause, program design
must be structured to pass each prong of the Lemon test. Even in
states that allow vouchers and tax benefits for private school
education, it would be prudent for the program to explicitly restrict
the schools' use of government funds to secular purposes.
Secular purposes that satisfy the Lemon test would also satisfy states'
public purpose doctrines. States would be wise to plainly specify the
public purposes for their government aid programs in a prominent
part of the program's design. For state constitutions that include the
term "appropriation" in prohibiting government aid of private
schools, program design must account for the fact that tax credits
would pass constitutional muster while vouchers, if paid from funds
in government treasury, would not. Besides, in order to preclude
participating private schools from deriving a windfall, voucher
programs must specifically prohibit the schools from raising the
tuition of participating students beyond what they ordinarily charge
their students; otherwise, some schools could simply raise their
tuition by the amount of the government aid, creating a windfall.
manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect.").
716. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
717. Hollman, supra note 9, at 13, 15.
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State constitutional provisions protect the public fisc by prohibiting
government funding of private schools in several ways, including:
constitutional requirements of a uniform and efficient public school
system, state or local control over schools that receive government
funding, prohibition of gifts or new debt by the State, and mandates
that government funds must be used only for a public end. These
provisions also help limit the potential threat from government-
funded private schools to the viability and survival of the public
school system. This is important because often times, public school is
the only school some demographics of students have real access to.
For instance, undermining the public school system has previously
been used as a weapon of denouement to prevent racial
desegregation; and it could be subtly used again, exacerbating
educational inequities for minorities."' As the Anti-Defamation
League notes, "the proud legacy of Brown v. Board of Education may be
tossed away as tax dollars are siphoned off to deliberately segregated
schools," a reference to private schools, which are often segregated. 9
Courts sometimes require accountability and reporting
mechanisms in aid programs in order to oversee their
constitutionality and to ensure that private schools that receive
government funds use such funds appropriately and as worthy
stewards of taxpayer dollars. Policymakers should therefore keep this
in mind in program design. Furthering the theme of accountability,
in the interest of constitutional stewardships, states would be sensible
to fund vouchers and tax benefit refunds from funding sources other
than those allotted for public schools-in other words, from funds
other than the common school fund, public school fund, or state
school fund.720 This is particularly critical in states where the courts
718. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 220-21
(1964) (discussing the closure of public schools in Virginia in a bid to preclude,
subvert, or minimize public school desegregation).
719. Anti-Defamation League, supra note 374, at 51.
720. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 2 (stating that "[n]o money or property
belonging to the public school fund, or to this State, for the benefit of schools or
universities, shall ever be used for any other than for the respective purposes to
which it belongs"); CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 4 ("The fund, called the School Fund, shall
remain a perpetual fund, the interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated to the
support and encouragement of the public schools throughout the state, and for the
equal benefit of all the people thereof. The value and amount of said fund shall be
ascertained in such manner as the general assembly may prescribe, published, and
recorded in the comptroller's office; and no law shall ever be made, authorizing such
fund to be diverted to any other use than the encouragement and support of public
schools, among the several school societies, as justice and equity shall require."); KY.
CONST. § 186 ("All funds accruing to the school fund shall be used for the
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or the constitution might require that public school funds be used
exclusively for public school education. In the same vein, in a state
like Colorado that constitutionally mandates local control over locally
raised revenue, government aid programs must not require the use of
locally raised funds for private school education if the State wants to
avoid constitutional fatality.7 2 1
States can also hold participating private schools accountable by
mandating that they give their students the same state assessments as
public schools and that the schools annually report the results to the
State. States should similarly require schools to annually inform
parents of the results, so that the parents can make educated
decisions about the future education of their children, including
whether to continue at that school or transfer to another private
school or a public school.
As a form of self-accountability that could enhance the
constitutionality of government aid program, particularly one
benefitting sectarian schools, the State could demand that private schools
conduct annual independent audits of their spending of government
funds under the program. Further, sectarian schools should be
prohibited from mingling program funds from the government with
the school's own funds intended for sectarian purposes.
If the State wants to justify shifting funds from public schools to
private schools as a means of saving money, it must specify both a
maximum number of parents and businesses eligible for the vouchers
or tax benefits and a maximum statewide tax credit or voucher
amount set at a level that is lower than the cost of educating
participating students in the local school districts. Such caps would
promote accountability for expenditure of taxpayer money.
Strict accountability is likewise important for government aid
programs. Without accountability, "some private schools may
promote agendas antithetical to the American ideal," and "it may be
difficult to prevent schools run by the Nation of Islam or the Ku Klux
Klan from receiving public funds to subsidize their racist and anti-
Semitic agendas." 2  The public school system might be the last
bastion to promote and perpetuate values of diversity and tolerance
maintenance of the public schools of the Commonwealth, and for no other purpose,
and the General Assembly shall by general law prescribe the manner of the
distribution of the public school fund among the school districts and its use for
public school purposes.").
721. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 934
(Colo. 2004) (en banc).
722. Anti-Defamation League, supra note 374, at 51.
1434 [Vol. 65:1335
SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND TAx BENEFITS
that could help carry on the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education;
therefore, states implementing government aid programs must
ensure that their public school systems are not thereby imperiled. 2 3
Policymakers, educators, and the public should consider the following
perspective as the debate over vouchers and tax benefits rages on:
Implementation of voucher [and tax benefit] programs sends a
clear message that we are giving up on public education.
Undoubtedly, vouchers [and tax benefits] would help some
students. But the glory of the American system of public education
is that it is for all children, regardless of their religion, their academic
talents or their ability to pay a fee. This policy of inclusiveness has
made public schools the backbone of American democracy. 724
Irrespective of the innovations in education our nation embraces,
we must ensure that a vibrant, inclusive education system endures.
We owe this much to our children and future generations.
723. Id. at 52.
724. Id.
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